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Provisional Release at the ICTY: Rights of the
Accused and the Debate that Amended a Rule
Raphael Sznajder*
Justice is an indispensable ingredient of the process of national reconciliation. It is
essential to the restoration of peaceful and normal relations between people who
have had to live under a reign of terror. It breaks the cycle of violence, hatred and
extra-judicial retribution. Thus Peace and Justice go hand-in-hand. - Antonio
Cassese, 24 November 1995.
INTRODUCTION
¶1

¶2

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (hereinafter ICTY or the
Tribunal) detains accused individuals throughout trial proceedings at the United Nations
Detention Unit (hereinafter UNDU), which is located close to the Tribunal in The Hague. 1
During breaks in trial, the Tribunal’s accused may be granted provisional release subject to
certain conditions. Such conditions are set forth in Rule 65(B) (hereinafter the Rule) of the ICTY
Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE).2
On October 20, 2011, the judges at the ICTY amended Rule 65(B) of the RPE governing
the administration of provisional release.3 The Amendment took effect on October 28.4 The
apparent purpose of the October 2011 amendment was to mitigate the effect of a highly
subjective requirement brought about by judicial interpretation, through the creation of
questionable precedent. The precedent, set forth by the Appeals Chamber in 2008 interjected a
requirement obligating accused in late stages of proceedings to demonstrate that they had
sufficiently “compelling humanitarian grounds” in order to be provisionally released—in
addition to fulfilling the objective requirements of Rule 65(B). With the most recent amendment
to Rule 65(B), the ICTY demonstrated a commitment to upholding the rights of its accused by
affording them a meaningful presumption of innocence with regard to their ability to be
provisionally released. In doing so, the ICTY addressed a significant controversy that had
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1 See Detention, ICTY WEBSITE, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/Detention.
2 ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc IT/32/Rev. 46 (Oct. 21, 2011) [hereinafter ICTY
RPE].
3 Id.
4 Id.
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challenged the Tribunal throughout its mandate, and made an imprint on its legacy in
international criminal justice.
The ICTY has long struggled to determine the proper standard for provisional release. The
recent amendment was the culmination of years of debate among the various chambers at the
Tribunal over exactly what that standard should be. The back-and-forth that took place among
ICTY judges over this standard is emblematic of a larger debate in the developing international
criminal law jurisprudence. In particular, to what extent can certain internationally embraced
rights of the accused be protected given the unique ideological and practical considerations that
characterize several of the ad hoc tribunals?
The mandate of the ICTY—the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the former Yugoslavia since 1991—is to
adjudicate criminal atrocities of immense gravity and historical magnitude. The ideological
significance of the exercise of the due process of law is to bring about justice, national
reconciliation and redress for the victims of atrocities of this magnitude.
Moreover, practical limitations on the most basic institutional level clearly constrain the
Tribunal in its ability to carry out its mandate in a satisfactory way to all stakeholders. For
example, the ICTY is located hundreds of miles away from the locations in which the crimes
within its jurisdiction occurred.5 The accused are not tried in their native countries, but in The
Hague, which makes the accused’s presence in The Hague during trial a practical necessity.
Providing individual private accommodations for all accused would prove logistically unwieldy
and expensive for the Tribunal given the necessity of securing and monitoring them.
Further, while the Netherlands has agreed to host such accused war criminals in contained
settings, it is unlikely that it would be similarly amenable to granting them complete freedom
within the country.6 Moreover, victim and witness protection are paramount priorities at the
ICTY.7 The defendants are accused of crimes of the highest gravity and often continue to wield
substantial influence in their countries of origin.8 In these ways, the dilemma posed by the
ICTY’s provision of custodial arrangements for accused war criminals before it is unlike that
faced by criminal courts in domestic jurisdictions.

5

See, e.g., Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an International Criminal Procedure: Due Process Aspirations and
Limitations, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 635, 658–59 (2007) (discussing the practical limitations of ICTY and
other international criminal tribunals).
6 See, e.g., Andrew Trotter, Innocence, Liberty and Provisional Release at the ICTY: A Post-Mortem of ‘Compelling
Humanitarian Grounds’ in Context, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 353, 369 (2012) (“Of course, in the case of tribunals such
as the ICTY, there are certain practical difficulties with the provisional release of defendants during trial. Tribunals
that are set up on the territory of a third state require detainees’ presence in the country to attend their trials, but are
unlikely to be able to secure, or inclined to negotiate, long-term residential visas for alleged war criminals, many of
whom may yet to be captured or even identified at the establishment of the tribunal”); see also Caroline L.
Davidson, No Shortcuts on Human Rights: Bail and the International Criminal Trial, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 68
(2010) (finding reluctance of host country to allowing international criminal defendants to roam free on its soil
presents a “significant obstacle”).
7 See Davidson, supra note 6, at 53 (“[T]he ICTY does not allow victims any participation rights. However, the
provisional release decisions reflect a concern over victims’ rights to protection and their interests generally. The
decision to require ‘sufficiently compelling humanitarian circumstances’ seems in no small part motivated by
concern for victims” (internal citation omitted)); see also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mučić also
known as “Pavo,” Hazim Delić & Esad Landžo also known as “Zenga,” IT-96-21-T, Decision on Motion for
Provisional Release Filed by the Accused Hazim Delić, ¶ 3 (Oct. 24, 1996).
8 Davidson, supra note 6, at 35 (citing Patricia M. Wald & Jenny Martinez, Provisional Release at the ICTY: A
Work in Progress, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROC. & EVID. 231, 236 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Wald &
Martinez]).
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The determination of the appropriate standard for provisional release has challenged the
ICTY since its earliest cases and has been the source of intense debate among judges and
practitioners alike. In 1999, in an effort to more closely emulate international human rights
standards, the Tribunal amended Rule 65(B) by removing the requirement that the accused show
“exceptional circumstances” in order to be provisionally released.9 Then, nearly a decade later, in
what seemed to be a swing in the opposite direction, the Appeals Chamber added a requirement
through precedent: that an accused demonstrate “compelling humanitarian grounds” in
applications for provisional release to justify release made at late stages of proceedings. 10 For
accused in late stages of proceedings, the standard created by precedent in 2008 was even more
stringent than had existed before the 1999 amendment.
¶8
The precedent created by the Appeals Chamber became binding on Trial Chambers,
imposing an obligation on them to make a subjective assessment of the sufficiency of the
accused’s “compelling humanitarian grounds,” which were now needed to justify provisional
release during breaks in the proceedings. This unconventional, unilateral policy change by the
Appeals Chamber drew criticism on both procedural and substantive grounds. The central
criticism of the new requirement for provisional release was that it contravened the presumption
of innocence.11 Finally, over three years later, on October 28, 2011, the Rule was again amended
to eliminate the “compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement, marking the second time in the
Tribunal’s short history that it eliminated a subjective requirement concerning the grant of
provisional release to its accused.
¶9
The various incarnations of the ICTY’s standard for provisional release reflect its general
struggle to calibrate a presumption of innocence standard suitable to its accused. The Tribunal’s
apparent ambivalence as to the proper standard for provisional release results from the division
among the Tribunal’s judges as to the appropriate balance of the values at play: the right of the
accused to be presumed innocent before conviction versus the competing ideological and
practical considerations unique to the Tribunal and the accused that come before it.
¶10
Part One of this article elucidates the competing human rights values at stake in
provisional release. Such rights have historically been truncated due to the Tribunal’s unique
realities and values. Part Two selectively tracks the textual development of Rule 65(B) through
examination of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence leading up to Petković, the decision that created the
“compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement. This section offers the competing views
advanced by both sides of the debate.
¶11
In the most substantial section of the article, Part Three, I will pause to examine Petković,
the decision that spawned the “compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement of 2008 and
created uproar among judges at the Tribunal. The article will identify the judicial
misinterpretations that caused this hiccup in the ICTY’s administration of provisional release,
and resulted in a step backwards for the rights of its accused seeking to be provisionally released
from detention. It will first discuss the decision generally, and then it will focus on the misuse of
precedent as foundation for the decision. The precedent on which the Chamber did rely—
Prosecutor v. Prlić, et al. (hereinafter “Prlić”)—did not lead to the inference that the Chamber
construed: that an accused must demonstrate sufficiently “compelling humanitarian grounds” to
9

See ICTY RPE, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc IT/32/Rev. 17 (Nov. 17, 1999).
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav
Pušić, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, Decision on “Prosecution’s Appeal From Décision Relative à la Demande de Mise en
Liberté Provisoire de l’Accusé Petković Dated 31 March 2008”, ¶ 15 (Apr. 21, 2008).
11 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 6, at 52.
10
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be granted provisional release in late stages of proceedings. In the discussion of precedent, this
article addresses Petković’s failure to consider an immediately prior decision, which dictated a
completely different course, and of subsequent chambers’ failure to adopt an alternate course
when offered the opportunity to do so by another Appeals Chamber in a decision immediately
following Petković.
¶12
The section will then address the procedural oddity of Petković in that Petković deviated
from the Tribunal’s established practice of rule amendment by using precedent rather than by
formally amending the RPE. Both the misuse of precedent and the circumvention of rule
amendment are failures of stare decisis on some level. In addition to these failures, the section
will also discuss the Chamber’s foremost misinterpretation—the mistaken emphasis on the stage
of trial at which an accused, still presumed innocent, requests provisional release. The final
section of Part Three illustrates the Petković Appeals Chamber’s error, by showing how the
resultant Rule conflated the provisional release standard between the ICTY’s accused during trial
and the ICTY’s guilty while pending appeal release standard.
¶13
Lastly, Part Four of this article examines the October 28, 2011 amendment to Rule 65(B)
and assesses its impact after a year in effect. Through examination of ICTY jurisprudence and
commentary, this article posits, and intends to demonstrate, that the ICTY made the right
decision in amending Rule 65(B) in October 2011. This article shows that the amendment has
proven effective in respecting the accused’s right to liberty, ultimately finding that the recent
amendment strikes an acceptable balance between the accused’s right to liberty and to be
presumed innocent before conviction, and the practical realities and ideological goals of the
ICTY. As such, the amendment bolsters the ICTY’s credibility as a fair arbiter of justice. This
article concludes that due to the realities of the ICTY, the presumption of innocence is more of
an aspiration than an absolute and rigid doctrine in this unique context. Nonetheless, the
presumption of innocence cannot be divorced from the aspirations of the ICTY. However,
neither can it be divorced from the atrocity crimes the Tribunal was created to address.
¶14
As the grandfather of modern international criminal law—the first in the second generation
of war crimes tribunals from which current and future international criminal tribunals look to for
guidance—the ICTY’s recent amendment to its provisional release rule was critical. The
Tribunal’s provisional release policy will be closely scrutinized and its internal debates followed.
Thus, the amendment will doubtless be instrumental in shaping the ICTY’s legacy and, even
more importantly, the amendment will also be instrumental to the development of international
criminal law.
PART ONE: THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ICTY
The ICTY is entrusted with bringing justice to the former Yugoslavia. First and
foremost, this means justice for the victims, their relatives and other innocent
people. Justice, however, also means respect for the alleged perpetrators’
fundamental rights.12
¶15

The ICTY is mandated to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for among the
worst abuses of basic human rights and international humanitarian law during the violent
12

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala & Isak Musliu, IT-03-66-AR65, Decision on Fatmir Limaj’s
Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 11 (Oct. 31, 2003).
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disintegration of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.13 As an international bastion of justice, the ICTY was
to succeed where the Nuremburg and Tokyo Tribunals failed: fulfilling its mandate, while
upholding the rights of the accused.14 To safeguard the human rights of victims of this conflict,
the ICTY was established to bring the perpetrators of these grave crimes—former military and
political leaders, the so-called “untouchables”—to justice.15 In addition to protecting the human
rights of victims, as a fair and neutral arbiter of atrocity crimes, the ICTY has a duty to protect
the rights of its accused, irrespective of the gravity of their alleged crimes.16
¶16
Among all of the rights implicated in detention, provisional release most directly
implicates the presumption of innocence. At the ICTY’s inception, then-Secretary General of the
United Nations Boutros Boutros-Ghali asserted:
It is axiomatic that the International Tribunal must fully respect internationally
recognized standards regarding the rights of the accused at all stages of its
proceedings… such internationally recognized standards are, in particular,
contained in article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.17
¶17

Article 14(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereinafter
ICCPR) states “everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed
innocent until proved guilty according to law.”18 Article 14(2) of the ICCPR was adopted
verbatim in article 21 of the ICTY Statute.19
¶18
The Tribunal therefore has a de jure obligation to provide its accused with the presumption
of innocence.20 Applied to provisional release, the purest form of the presumption contains three
implications.21 First, the defendant must be treated as innocent until proven guilty, in which case
any detention necessitates strong justifications. Second, the burden of proof for any continued
detention rests on the prosecutor rather than the defendant, meaning that the defendant should
not have to prove innocence to be provisionally released, instead the prosecutor should prove
that the accused should not be provisionally released. Third, an accused must be proven guilty
through a clear and discrete standard of proof, which should be used to justify continued
detention when not otherwise required.22

13

See Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY WEBSITE, http://www.icty.org/sections/AbouttheICTY/OfficeoftheProsecutor
(last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
14 Gordon, supra note 5, at 658–59.
15 Wolfgang Schomburg, The Role of International Criminal Tribunals in Promoting Respect for Fair Trial Rights,
8 NW. U. J. INT’L. HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (2009) (noting that these individuals were referred to as untouchables because
they allegedly committed heinous crimes but were historically shielded from prosecution).
16 Id.
17 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution
808, ¶ 106, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993).
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
19 ICTY Statute, art. 20(3) (May 25, 1993).
20 See, e.g., Trotter, supra note 6.
21 See Davidson, supra note 6, at 15 (citing ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 390 (2003) and
SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 84 (2003)).
22 Id.
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PART TWO: THE EVOLUTION OF RULE 65(B) FOR PROVISIONAL RELEASE
A. Exceptional Circumstances Requirement
¶19

During trial at the ICTY, the purpose of detaining accused at the UNDU is primarily
practical. Detention ensures that the accused appears for trial and does not pose a danger to
anyone. As such, there have always been two objective requirements contained in the text of
Rule 65(B) that an accused must satisfy in order to be provisionally released during the course of
proceedings: 1) he will not pose a flight risk; and 2) he will not pose a danger to any victim,
witness, or any other person. The first iteration of Rule 65(B), adopted on February 11, 1994,
provided:
Release may be ordered by a Trial Chamber only in exceptional circumstances
and only if it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if released, will
not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person.23

¶20

Under this Rule 65(B), there were four factors that had to be satisfied for an accused to be
granted provisional release. They were: 1) that “exceptional circumstances” existed; 2) that there
were no objections raised from the host country; 3) that the accused would appear for his trial if
released; and 4) that the accused would pose no danger to any victim, witness or other person.
The burden of proof rested on the defense, and these factors were conjunctive, so that a chamber
could exercise discretion to deny release even if all factors were met. The Rule existed as such
until November, 1999.
¶21
The Rule contained one procedural factor, two objective factors, and one subjective factor.
The objective factors were to be tested after first addressing the procedural factor–i.e., giving the
host country the opportunity to voice its objections. The remaining objective factor was common
to most jurisdictions for an accused to be granted provisional release.24 However, the subjective
factor was not common to other jurisdictions.25 Even if a trial chamber were satisfied that an
accused posed no danger to anybody nor risk of flight, the general rule was that an accused
would be detained.26 Provisional release was granted extremely sparingly—only four times in the
five years that this version of Rule 65(B) was in effect, and only in cases in which lifethreatening health conditions existed.27 The reasons that constituted “exceptional circumstances”
23

ICTY RPE, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32 (Feb. 11, 1994); additionally, Rule 65(B) was amended on January 30,
1995 to provide that the host country (typically in the Former Yugoslavia) would be given the opportunity to express
its view on the provisional release of the accused as well; see ICTY RPE, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc IT/32/Rev. 3 (Jan.
30, 1995).
24 Davidson, supra note 6, at 20–21 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744 (1987)); see also R. v.
Pearson, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 665, ¶ 4 (Can.) (U.S. and Canadian Supreme Courts have held that the government can
“constitutionally restrict a person’s liberty if there is a permissive regulatory purpose, such as ensuring the
defendant’s presence at trial or ‘preventing danger to the community,’ and the measure is not excessive”); Daniel J.
Rearick, Innocent Until Alleged Guilty: Provisional Release at the ICTR, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 577, 579 (2003).
25 See ICTY RPE, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 41 (Feb. 28, 2008) (the determination of those “exceptional
circumstances” under which provisional release may be granted is subjective).
26 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić & Stojan Župljanin, IT-08-91-AR65.2, Decision on Mićo Stanišić’s Appeal
Against Decision on his Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 3 (Aug. 29, 2011) (Robinson, J., dissenting) (“As is
evident from the text of the Rule at that time, provisional release was an exception to the general rule of detention”).
27 Kate Doran, Provisional Release in International Human Rights Law and International Criminal Law, 11 INT’L.
CRIM. L.R. 707, 719 (2011) (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić & Mario Čerkez, IT-95-14/2-T, Order on
Motion of the Accused Mario Cerkez for Provisional Release (Sept. 22, 1999); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zoran
Kupreškić, Mirjan Kupreškić, Vlatko Kupreškić, Drago Josipović, Dragan Papić & Vladimir Šantić also known as
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were: in order for the accused to obtain specialized treatment unavailable in The Hague, 28
because the accused was terminally ill,29 or so that the accused could visit a terminally ill
parent.30 In practice, the subjective factor became determinative in applications for provisional
release.
¶22
Judge Patricia Wald of the ICTY noted that under this Rule, ICTY jurisprudence regarding
the two objective prongs were “technically gratuitous or dicta,” because trial chambers did not
need to go beyond finding an absence of “exceptional circumstances” to deny an accused
provisional release.31 And the presence of exceptional circumstances during this period did not
guarantee provisional release; it was merely a factor assessed in the mix, used principally to deny
provisional release to accused who otherwise met the objective and procedural criteria delineated
in Rule 65(B).
¶23
As a result, this provisional release policy carried a strong presumption of detention, as
acknowledged by the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Blaškić et al. (hereinafter “Blaškić”). In its
December 1996 judgment denying provisional release, the Trial Chamber posited:
…both the letter of [Rule 65(B)] and the spirit of the Statute of the International
Tribunal require that the legal principle is detention of the accused and that
release is the exception; that, in fact, the gravity of the crimes being prosecuted by
the International Tribunal leaves no place for any other interpretation even if it is
based on the general principles of law governing the applicable provisions in
respect of national laws which in principle may not be transposed to international
criminal law.32
¶24

Recognizing the truism that provisional release would only be granted exceptionally, the
Blaškić Chamber articulated the status quo at the Tribunal in this era: detention was the rule and
provisional release the exception.
¶25
During the reign of the “exceptional circumstances” requirement, trial chambers at the
Tribunal gave only marginal credence to prevailing international human rights standards
regarding rights of the accused. They justified the provisional release stringency by reference to
the Tribunal’s unique circumstances, and judges often distinguished the ICTY from domestic
jurisdictions in which comparatively liberal detention standards for accused were used.
¶26
For example, in Prosecutor v. Delalić et al. (hereinafter “Delalić”) in September 1996, the
Trial Chamber explicitly recognized that the Tribunal’s provisional release regime was at odds
with prevailing international human rights standards.33 The Delalić Trial Chamber justified the
“Vlado”, IT-95-16-T, Decision on the Motion of Defense Counsel for Drago Josipović, (May 7, 1999); ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Milan Simić, IT-95-9-PT, Decision on Provisional Release of the Accused (Mar. 26, 1998); and ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Đorđe Đukić, IT-96-20-T, Decision Rejecting the Application to withdraw the Indictment and Order
for Provisional Release (Apr. 24, 1996)).
28 Simić, IT-95-9-PT, supra note 28.
29 Đjukic, IT-96-20-T, supra note 28.
30 Kupreškić, IT-95-16-T, supra note 28.
31 Megan A. Fairlie, The Precedent of Pretrial Release at the ICTY: A Road Better Left Less Traveled, 33 FORDHAM
INT’L. L.J. 1101, 1151 (2010) (quoting Wald & Martinez, supra note 8, at 231).
32 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Tihomir Blaškić, IT-95-14, Order Denying a Motion for Provisional Release, 4 (Dec. 20,
1996).
33 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Zdravko Mucić also known as “Pavo,” Hazim Delić & Esad Landžo also
known as “Zenga,” IT-96-21-T, Decision of Motion for Provisional Release filed by the Accused Zenjnil Delalić, ¶¶
19–20 (Sept. 25, 1996).
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Tribunal’s contravention to international norms concerning the presumption of innocence by
distinguishing the gravity of the crimes before the Tribunal and its lack of an enforcement
mechanism.34 “[B]oth the shifting of the burden to the accused and the requirement that he show
‘exceptional circumstances’ to qualify for provisional release are justified by the extreme gravity
of the offences with which persons before the International Tribunal are charged and the unique
circumstances under which the Tribunal operates.”35 It also noted the Tribunal’s reliance on hostcountry cooperation which further logistically complicated an accused’s possibility of release . 36
¶27
During the ICTY’s formative years, such an exceptionally stringent provisional release
regime could be understood as a byproduct of the fulfillment of its foremost mandate in bringing
the “untouchables” to justice. To be sure, as the Tribunal was getting off the ground, the
possibility of the accused escaping could have devastating effects on the Tribunal’s credibility in
the countries of the former Yugoslavia and it could undermine the Tribunal’s legitimacy while
the entire world was watching. Unlike domestic jurisdictions, if a defendant were to abscond at
the ICTY, the Tribunal had no police to search for him.37 Furthermore, an escape would be
politically disastrous. U.N. and NATO forces had risked their lives arresting suspects who had
evaded the Tribunal. If the accused were then granted provisional release, even if they did not
abscond, U.N. and NATO efforts might appear to have been taken for granted.
¶28
On its face, such rationalization may appear inconsistent with the presumption of
innocence contained in the ICTY’s Statute. Under Daniel Rearick’s rubric, detention justified by
the gravity of an alleged crime is necessarily punitive.38 Rearick, supported by the Human Rights
Committee (hereinafter HRC), posits that detention must serve a clear objective aim. If it is not
flight risk or danger, then why detain? Prevailing international law also opposes any general rule
of detention because the denial of liberty constitutes treatment as guilty, which violates the first
principle of the presumption of innocence.39
¶29
The Tribunal’s lack of enforcement mechanisms, the necessary cooperation of states in the
former Yugoslavia, and concerns about danger to victims or witnesses are addressed by the flight
risk and danger inquiry contained in the objective prongs of Rule 65(B), without the additional
requirement of “exceptional circumstances.”40 The necessary reliance on other states and the
Tribunals’ lack of a police power, while important, are already factored into the analysis because
they affect the likelihood that the accused will appear for trial and if they pose a danger. Thus,
34

Id.
Id.
36 Id.
37 Davidson, supra note 6 (citing Wald & Martinez, supra note 8, at 236 (expressing concern that absence of a
police force increases the likelihood that “once released an accused could escape the International Tribunal’s
grasp”)).
38 See, e.g., Rearick, supra note 25, at 577; see also Lorraine Smith, Provisional Release, INTERNATIONAL BAR
ASS’N ICC MONITORING AND OUTREACH PROGRAM,
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=F50F53C7-2623-461E-955A-37C3E9EF73C2 (last
accessed Apr. 14, 2013).
39 For example, ICCPR article 9(3) states: “anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge . . . shall be entitled to
trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be
detained in custody. . .” ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 9(3). The Human Rights Committee (HRC) has similarly stated
that detention should be the exception. See Smith, supra note 39, at 2 (providing that the HRC has similarly stated
that “detention should be as short as possible” and “limited to essential reasons, such as danger of absconding . . .
suppression of evidence, witness interference, or repetition of the offence”).
40 Davidson, supra note 6, at 65 (“[A]t the ICTY, victims’ rights to protection are already largely addressed in the
danger or future crime prong of the release inquiry”); see also Matthew M. DeFrank, Provisional Release: Current
Practice, a Dissenting Voice, and the Case for a Rule Change, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1429, 1431 (2002) (observing that
the objective prongs require that the defense show that the defendant would not pose a danger to victims if released).
35
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the “exceptional circumstances” requirement could be seen as superfluous, even harmful,
because it derailed the provisional release inquiry from meaningful evaluation of the objective
requirements.41 By diverting the legal analysis to an unduly subjective requirement, this
incarnation of Rule 65(B) inadequately accounted for the presumption of innocence.
B. 1999 Amendment to Rule 65(B)
¶30

As the Tribunal established itself and gained credibility, it came time to revisit the Rule
that governed its provisional release policy. On November 17, 1999, Rule 65(B) was amended to
eliminate the subjective “exceptional circumstances” requirement.42
¶31
Although it is impossible to ascertain the exact legislative intent behind rule amendments
at the ICTY because its plenary meetings are held in private, the reason the subjective
requirement was eliminated is apparent. Former President of the ICTY, Judge Patrick Robinson
advanced that the Rule was amended due to concerns about its “conformity with international
human rights standards which make clear that release should be the rule before a conviction, and
not the exception.”43 Another reason advanced was the imminent publication of a report
produced by an expert group evaluating the work of ICTY which found that the “exceptional
circumstances” standard proved “difficult to satisfy” in practice, and reported “serious concerns
regarding the generally recognized right to a speedy trial.”44 An additional reason was that judges
were concerned about the “depressive effects” of prolonged detention following the deaths of
two defendants in detention while awaiting trial.45 In sum, the Rule, as originated, infringed too
much on the rights of the accused at the ICTY.
¶32
Hence, at the Twenty-First Plenary Session in December 1999, a majority of judges voted
to amend Rule 65(B) to omit the words “only in exceptional circumstances.”46 The amended rule
provided:
Release may be ordered by a Trial Chamber only after giving the host country and
the state to which the accused seeks to be released the opportunity to be heard and
only if it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if released, will not
pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person.47
¶33

Following the 1999 amendment, the objective-subjective hybrid test became a twopronged objective test, with the procedural prong requiring hearing from the host country.
¶34
Early reports of the amendment’s effects were positive from a human rights perspective.
“The rule that once functioned as a roadblock now draws a line between two classes of cases,”
those cases in which the accused poses a risk of flight or a danger to witnesses and victims, and
those in which the accused does not.48 In observing its effects, Rearick noted that Simo Zarić and
41

Rearick, supra note 25, at 589–91.
See ICTY RPE, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 17 (Nov. 17, 1999).
43 See Stanišić, IT-08-91-AR65.2, supra note 27.
44 See Fairlie, supra note 32, at 1134–35 (citing Report of the Expert Group to Conduct a Review of the Effective
and Functioning of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda, ¶ 51, U.N. Doc. A/54/634 (Nov. 22, 1999) (internal quotations omitted)).
45 Geoffrey R. Watson, The Changing Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 871, 881 (2003) (quoting Wald and Martinez, supra note 8, at 233).
46 ICTY RPE, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 17 (Nov. 17, 1999).
47 Id.
48 Rearick, supra note 25, at 589–91.
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Miroslav Tadić, previously denied provisional release for failing to prove “exceptional
circumstances,” were released post-amendment.49 With optimism, he noted that at least twelve
provisional release applications had been granted within the first three years, compared with only
four in the five years prior.50 The new analysis offered the possibility that the objective Rule
65(B) criteria would be evaluated by their merits to the potential benefit of many accuseddetainees.51 From a human rights perspective, such optimism was warranted: a 300% increase in
provisional release applications granted, in almost half the time, was significant progress toward
affording accused a meaningful presumption of innocence at the Tribunal.
1. Discretion to deny provisional release post-amendment
¶35

Despite the loosening of the criteria for an accused to be granted provisional release under
the 1999 amendment, many trial chambers at the ICTY routinely denied applications for
provisional release even when the objective criteria of the Rule were met.52 The Tribunal’s
chambers may exercise discretion to deny provisional release even when an accused satisfies the
objective requirements of Rule 65(B).53
¶36
In the July 2000 case, Prosecutor v. Brdjanin et al. (hereinafter “Brjdanin”), the Trial
Chamber stated:
It is not in dispute that Rule 65(B), by the use of the word ‘may’, gives to the
Trial Chamber a discretion [sic] as to whether release is ordered. But it should be
clearly understood that…it is a discretion to refuse the order notwithstanding that
the applicant has established the two matters which that Rule identifies.54
¶37

The issue of whether chambers at the ICTY retain discretion to deny provisional release
after the accused satisfies the objective requirements remains contested. A number of judges hold
the view that a chamber has an obligation to exercise its discretion to grant provisional release
when the objective and procedural criteria of Rule 65(B) have been satisfied.55 However, the
controlling jurisprudence maintains that a chamber retains the discretion to deny release even
when the objective requirements are met.

49

Id. at 590.
Id.
51 Id.
52 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brđanin & Momir Talić, IT-99-36-T, Decision on Motion by Radoslav Brđanin for
Provisional Release, ¶ 22 (July 25, 2000).
53 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj & Lahi Brahimaj, IT-04-84-T, Decision on Motion on Behalf
of Ramush Haradinaj for Provisional Release, ¶ 8 (July 20, 2007) (despite the Trial Chamber’s satisfaction
Haradinaj posed no flight risk or danger to any witness, victim, or person, the Chamber denied his release based on
its desire to not contribute to the intimidating atmosphere in Kosovo in which witnesses were scared to testify before
the Tribunal, though there was no evidence Haradinaj would contribute to the intimidation).
54 Brđanin, IT-99-36-T, supra note 52.
55 See Stanišić, IT-08-91-AR65.2, supra note 27, ¶¶ 7, 29 (“[W]hen a statutory or regulatory provision identifies the
condition(s) for the exercise of a discretion, and that condition(s) has been fulfilled, the decision-maker,
notwithstanding the use of the word ‘may,’ is required to exercise his or her discretion in favour of the beneficiary”);
see also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik & Biljana Plavšić, IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on Momčilo
Krajišnik’s Notice of Motion for Provisional Release, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Patrick Robinson (Oct. 8, 2001)
(if the Trial Chamber is satisfied that the two objective factors of Rule 65(B) have been met, it has an obligation to
grant provisional release).
50
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Consequently, denials of provisional release continued to be the norm and trial chambers
routinely denied applications for release even after an accused proved not to pose a risk of risk of
flight, nor a danger to victims, witnesses, or other people.56 On the other hand, there is no
corresponding discretion to grant provisional release when the objective requirements have not
been met. This inconsistency in the permissible exercise of judicial discretion is a telling
example of the balance of values at play in the ICTY’s proceedings.
2. Towards conformity with international standards

¶39

Notably, following the 1999 amendment some judges gave more consideration to the
weight that should be afforded to internationally accepted rights of the accused. Some trial
chambers exercised their newfound license to grant provisional release, and used international
human rights standards in support. Unrestricted by the “exceptional circumstances” requirement,
some chambers no longer felt obligated to categorically deny release in its absence. Indeed, in
the post-“exceptional circumstances” regime, several decisions referenced explicitly the relevant
principles enshrined in the ICCPR, ECHR, and the Tribunal’s Statute, identifying the
presumption of innocence as the underlying principle of provisional release.57
¶40
In Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović et al. (hereinafter “Hadžihasanović”) the Trial Chamber
evinced a growing trend at the ICTY—among certain chambers—to better align its provisional
release jurisprudence with internationally recognized rights of accused.58 The Trial Chamber
devoted space in its opinion to elaborate on the role of international human rights standards and
the presumption of innocence, and how they were relevant to the provisional release inquiry. 59 In
particular, the Trial Chamber reproduced article 21(3) of the Statute mandating the presumption
of innocence until proven guilty, and recalled that the provision reflected international standards
contained in the ECHR and ICCPR, which states that detention should not be the general rule.60
¶41
While acknowledging that the Tribunal’s circumstances were unique from other
jurisdictions,61 unlike other ICTY chambers, the Hadžihasanović Chamber focused on the
objective criteria contained in the Rule (rather than the subjective criteria that had been
eliminated by amendment).62 In assessing the Rule’s objective criteria, the Chamber noted
Hadžihasanović’s voluntary surrender and cooperation with the Tribunal.63 The Trial Chamber
56

See, e.g. Haradinaj, IT-04-84-T, supra note 53.
See Limaj, IT-03-66-AR65, supra note 12; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Darko Mrđa, IT-02-59-PT, Decision on Darko
Mrđa request for provisional release, ¶¶ 22–26 (Apr. 15, 2003); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola
Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević & Sreten Lukić, IT-05-87-PT, Decision on
Sainović’s Request for Variation of Conditions for Provisional Release, ¶ 36 (June 28, 2006).
58 The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has balanced competing interests similar to those of the ICTY
with the presumption of innocence and, in doing so, has afforded the presumption of innocence greater weight. In
Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, the ECtHR held “the gravity of the charges” alone cannot “justify long periods of detention on
remand.” See Davidson, supra note 6, at 16 (citing Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, 2001-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. P 81 (2001)).
59 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Enver Hadžihasanović, Mehmed Alagic & Amir Kubura, IT-01-47-PT, Decision Granting
Provisional Release to Enver Hadžihasanović (Dec. 19, 2001).
60 Id. ¶¶ 2–3 (Trial Chamber restated Article 9(3) of the ICCPR, providing that “[I]t shall not be the general rule that
persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody,” and its ECHR analog, “[E]veryone arrested or detained […]
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial”).
61 Id. ¶ 7 (It stated that the primary reason for the de facto rule of detention was because the Tribunal lacked
“coercive powers” to enforce its decisions
62 Id. ¶ 13 (alluding to the fact that nebulous or subjective criteria were ill-suited to justify detention of an accused, it
noted, “[N]ormally, the prerequisites for any deprivation of liberty should be established by law exclusively (see e.g.
Statute of the International Criminal Court of 17 July 1998, Article 60(2)”).
63 Id. ¶¶ 14–15.
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seriously considered Hadžihasanović’s rights infringed by detention. The Chamber consequently
granted him provisional release.64
The Hadžihasanović Trial Chamber directly addressed the issue of the gravity of the
crimes that the accused are charged with—the principal ideological justification for the ICTY’s
stringent provisional release regime. It found that because the ICTY’s full name stated explicitly
that it presided exclusively over “serious” crimes, yet Rule 65(B) nonetheless provided for
provisional release of the accused,65 that provisional release was clearly meant to apply in the
Tribunal’s specific context. As the RPE provided for provisional release upon satisfaction of the
objective criteria—the only criteria referenced in the text of Rule 65(B)—the Chamber found
that “any system of mandatory detention on remand [was] per se incompatible with article 5(3)
of the [European Court of Human Rights].”66
The Hadžihasanović Trial Chamber also directly addressed the weight of victims’ interests
in provisional release determinations—another chief ideological consideration perennially used
to justify detention of accused at the Tribunal. In response to the Prosecution’s argument that the
accused’s release would send the “wrong signal” to victims and the international community, the
Chamber answered that its role was to apply the law, not to send signals.67
The outlook advanced by the Hadžihasanović Chamber was particularly respectful of the
rights of the accused. Its reverence for Hadžihasanović’s right to liberty is particularly
noteworthy considering that he was ultimately found guilty for his crimes and sentenced to
prison.68 Despite the fact that he was ultimately found guilty, by granting his application for
provisional release, the Trial Chamber treated him as innocent, which is what the presumption of
innocence requires. As such, the Hadžihasanović approach to provisional release differed from
that of other chambers at the ICTY who still believed that the gravity of crimes and the interests
of victims outweighed the accused’s right to liberty during trial.
During this period of the ICTY’s provisional release regime, the divide among judges as to
the proper balance between rights of the accused and the Tribunal’s unique realities was
pronounced. Many trial chambers continued to exercise the discretion to deny provisional release
notwithstanding fulfillment of the Rule’s objective criterion. For example, in Brdjanin, in July
2000, the Trial Chamber distinguished the Tribunal from other jurisdictions to justify the
prolonged detention of Radoslav Brdjanin, an accused not yet proven guilty.69 “Care should be
taken that too great a reliance is not placed upon [the ECtHR and the ECHR] as defining what is
a reasonable length of…detention in an international criminal court or tribunal rather than in
particular domestic jurisdictions in Europe.”70 Emphasizing the Tribunal’s unique circumstances,
64

Id.
Id. (referring to the full name of the Tribunal: “The International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia since 1991”).
66 Id.
67 Hadžihasanović, IT-01-47-PT, id. ¶¶ 12–13.
68 Ultimately, Enver Hadžihasanović, a Senior Officer in the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was convicted and
sentenced to three and a half years for failing to prevent or punish perpetrators of cruel treatment to others at a
school. Case Information Sheet for Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, ICTY WEBSITE,
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/hadzihasanovic_kubura/cis/en/cis_hadzihasanovic_kubura_en.pdf (last accessed Apr.
23, 2013).
69 Brđjanin, IT-99-36-T, supra note 52, ¶ 25 (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-A,
Judgment, ¶ 185 (Mar. 24, 2000) (“The Tribunal was established in order to prosecute persons responsible for such
serious violations: Statute of the Tribunal, Article 1”)).
70 Id. ¶ 26.
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the Brdjanin Chamber adopted a sui generis approach to determining what constituted a
“reasonable length” of detention for Brdjanin.71
¶46
However, even at the ICTY, “reasonable” length of detention can only be stretched so far.
The complexity of the cases over which the ICTY presides makes for inordinately long trial
periods, which exacerbates the negative effects of detention.72 Additionally, prolonged detention
of those still presumed innocent contravenes the presumption of innocence according to
international human rights standards.73 Moreover, those defendants that are not ultimately
convicted pay a high price for the Tribunal’s detention policy during trial. The Tribunal has
acquitted eighteen accused thus far and all had been held in detention throughout their trials. 74
While the ICC, ECHR, and the ICCPR provide compensation for accused persons wrongfully
detained, the ICTY does not.75
¶47
For practical purposes, following the 1999 amendment, liberty continued to be the
exception and detention the rule.76 The burden of proof remained with the accused to prove that
he met the objective prongs of Rule 65(B), and the Tribunal’s Statute and RPE lacked a “clear
and precise criteria with regard to the application of the concrete possibility of release on bail.”77
This may explain why Professor Gregory S. Gordon noted that “postamendment provisionalrelease practices operate[d] in exactly the same manner” as pre-1999 amendment practices. 78
¶48
Still, the period following the removal of the “exceptional circumstances” requirement up
until Prosecutor v. Prlić et al. (“Petković”) saw more defendants provisionally released than ever
before. The liberty infringed by detention of the Tribunal’s accused were being meaningfully
considered by a number of the ICTY’s chambers, like Hadžihasanović, and international human
rights standards were finally included in the provisional release calculus. The differing
approaches to the provisional release inquiry advanced in the Hadžihasanović and Brdjanin
71

Id. (“First…the Tribunal has no power to execute its own arrest warrant in the event that the applicant does not
appear for trial, and it must rely upon local authorities within the former Yugoslavia or upon international bodies to
effect arrests on its behalf. That is markedly different to the powers of a court granting release in a domestic
jurisdiction. Secondly, the serious nature of the crimes charged in this Tribunal would be very unlikely to produce
sentences of such a short duration”); Radoslav Brdjanin was convicted of many atrocity crimes, and was ultimately
sentenced to thirty years in prison. See Appeals Chamber Reduces Radoslav Brđanin’s Sentence to 30 Years, ICTY
WEBSITE, http://www.icty.org/sid/8886 (last accessed Apr. 14, 2013).
72 See Schomburg, supra note 15, at 14 (noting as of October 31, 2008, accused were being held at the United
Nations Detention Unit (UNDU) for an average of five years. Of all people arrested on the ICTY’s behalf and
detained through trial and appeal, 511 days was the average time spent in detention before trial. 489 days was the
average time spent in detention during trial. And 663 days was the average time spent in detention while awaiting
the completion of appeal proceedings).
73 Both the ICCPR and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provide that the remedy for failure to
decide on charges expeditiously is release. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held that four or
more days without judicial supervision is inconsistent with Article 5(3) of the ECHR. Davidson, supra note 6, at 22–
23 (quoting M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 609 (2003) and citing
Tomasi v. France, App. No. 12850/87, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 49-50). Article 5(3) of the ECHR additionally states that
detention becomes unreasonable if authorities do not act with special diligence or if the proceedings take too long.
ECHR, art. 5(3). The HRC provides that no more than approximately three days should elapse between detention
and initial appearance, per Article 9(3) of the ICCPR. Schomburg, supra note 16, at 7.
74 See Key Figures ICTY, ICTY WEBSITE, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last visited April 23,
2013).
75 See Davidson, supra note 6, at 63 (“Although the ICTY’s statute and rules are silent on the possibility of
compensation after unlawful detention, compensation for unlawful detention appears to be a tool that is increasingly
available at international courts”).
76 Id. (citing ZAPPALA supra note 21, at 70).
77 See Gordon, supra note 5, at 640 (citing GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY, 21–22 (2003).
78 See Gordon, supra note 5, at 691 (citing DeFrank, supra note 41, at 1449) (internal quotations omitted).
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decisions are emblematic of a larger divide among judges at the ICTY. A chasm existed between
ICTY judges over the relative importance of its accuseds’ rights at the Tribunal. In comparison
to the provisional release practice under the former Rule 65(B), however, the Tribunal was
considering its defendants’ rights more significantly. This progression was dramatically derailed
after Prosecutor v. Prlić et al. (“Petković”) was decided in April of 2008.
PART THREE: COMPELLING HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS AND THE PETKOVIĆ PRECEDENT
¶49

In Part Two, this article sought to illuminate the competing interests and values at stake in
the debate over the ICTY’s provisional release regime through an examination of Rule 65(B)’s
amendment and representative decisions in the Tribunal’s provisional release jurisprudence. Part
Three will now demonstrate how one party to that debate successfully, although ultimately
mistakenly, advanced its preferred policy choice by co-opting the Tribunal’s provisional release
standard.
¶50
Nearly nine years after the “exceptional circumstances” requirement was eliminated by
amendment to the RPE, on April 21, 2008, the Appeals Chamber in Petković effectively
overturned the previous amendment’s elimination of the “exceptional circumstances”
requirement by reinserting a subjective requirement into the ICTY’s provisional release
criteria.79 This section analyzes the judicial misinterpretation committed in Petković and its effect
on provisional release at the ICTY over the next three years.
¶51
The decision in Petković was a “perfect storm” of judicial misinterpretation and missed
opportunities to correct a mistake which, from a human rights perspective, effectively turned
back the clock on the presumption of innocence provided to the Tribunal’s accused. This section
begins with an overview of the Petković decision itself. Secondly, it discusses the Decision’s
multifarious problems involving precedent. After discussing precedent, the analysis turns to
address a grand, hierarchical problem committed when the Petković Chamber essentially
circumvented the normal process for rule amendment. Fourth, the section addresses an
unfortunate consequence of the Decision—the legal conflation of standards for convicted and
accused defendants at the ICTY. Fifth and finally, this section examines the real effects of
Petković on subsequent provisional release decisions at the ICTY.
A. Petković
¶52

Milivoj Petković, Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, and Valentin Ćorić were
indicted for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war,
and crimes against humanity for their actions in the Croatian Defense Council during the conflict
in the former Yugoslavia.80 On January 30, 2008, Petković filed a motion requesting provisional
release at the 98bis stage of proceedings.81 98bis refers to the period in proceedings after the
close of the prosecution’s case and before the beginning of the defense’s case. During this period
the defense may move for acquittal and request that the Chamber consider whether the facts
presented are sufficient to support a conviction.82 If they are not, the defendant may be acquitted
Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10.
Case Information Sheet for Prlić, ICTY WEBSITE, http://www.icty.org/x/cases/prlic/cis/en/cis_prlic_al_en.pdf.
81 Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 2.
82 ICTY RPE, Rule 98bis, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 41 (Feb. 28, 2008) (“at the close of the Prosecutor’s case, the Trial
Chamber shall, by oral decision and after hearing the oral submissions of the parties, enter a judgment of acquittal
on any count if there is no evidence capable of supporting a conviction”).
79
80
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without having to present a defense case. The Trial Chamber granted Milivoj Petković’s Motion
on February 19, 2008.83 Two days later the Prosecution appealed that decision along with the
related decisions of the co-accused in Petković’s case.
¶53
On March 11, 2008, the Appeals Chamber granted the Prosecution’s Appeal and found that
the Trial Chamber had discernibly erred by failing to “explicitly discuss the impact of a 98bis
Ruling,” and also by considering the accused’s proffered humanitarian grounds as “capable of
justifying the granting of provisional release.”84 Six days later Petković’s Defense counsel again
filed a motion for provisional release.85 The Defense reiterated that the 98bis Ruling did not
constitute an increased risk of flight while submitting further evidence of Petković’s wife’s
depression as a humanitarian reason supporting his release.86 The Prosecution responded that
Petković was advancing a redundant argument that had already been dismissed.87, On March 21,
2008, Petković filed medical documentation substantiating his mother and wife’s poor health
condition to bolster the humanitarian grounds supporting provisional release.88 The Trial
Chamber again granted him provisional release by decision on March 31, 2008, but ordered a
stay pursuant to Rule 65(F) pending appeal.89 The Prosecution appealed on April 1, 2008.90
¶54
In its majority decision on April 21, 2008, the Appeals Chamber again overturned the Trial
Chamber’s Decision granting release.91 It held that applications for provisional release after the
98bis stage must be denied, unless accused met the objective criteria in Rule 65(B) and that there
existed “compelling humanitarian grounds” sufficient to justify provisional release.92 In so
holding the Appeals Chamber reintroduced a subjective requirement into the Tribunal’s
provisional release standard. In the Chamber’s view, the ICTY’s jurisprudence implied this
requirement: “[t]he Appeals Chamber notes that the development of the Tribunal’s jurisprudence
implies that an application for provisional release brought at a late stage of proceedings, and in
particular after the close of the Prosecution case, will only be granted when serious and
sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons exist.”93
Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 2.
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav
Pušić, IT-04-74-AR65.5, Decision on Prosecution’s Consolidated Appeal against Decisions to Provisionally Release
the Accused Prlić, Stojić, Praljak, Petković and Ćorić, ¶ 21 (Mar. 11, 2008).
85 Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 3.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. ¶ 4; ICTY RPE, Rule 65(F), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 41 (Feb. 28, 2008) (“[W]here the Trial Chamber grants a
stay of its decision to release an accused, the Prosecutor shall file his or her appeal not later than one day from the
rendering of that decision”).
90 Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 4.
91 Id.
92 Id. ¶ 17.
93 Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10 (as cited by the Petković Appeals Chamber, “Appeals Chamber
Decision,” ¶ 21; see also, inter alia, Prosecutor v. Ademi, Order on Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 22 (Feb. 20,
2002) (considered that the proximity of a prospective judgment may weigh against a decision to release); ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Halilović, IT-01-48-T, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release, 3–4 (Apr. 21, 2005) (Trial
Chamber I denied provisional release to the Accused considering “that the facts submitted by the Defence in support
of the Motion do not amount to ‘exceptional circumstances,’” and “the advanced stage of the Prosecution case
where most of the evidence in support of the Prosecution case has been presented and further Prosecution witnesses
are still to be heard”); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ramush Haradinaj, Idriz Balaj & Lahi Brahimaj, IT-04-84-T, Decision
on Defence Motion on Behalf of Ramush Haradinaj for Urgent Provisional Release, Confidential, 3 (Oct. 3, 2007);
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav
Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Décision Relative à la Demande de Mise en Liberté Provisoire de l’Accusé Prlajak, With a
Confidential Annex, 6–8 (Apr. 1, 2008); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub
83
84
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The decision in Petković placed significant weight on the 98bis ruling, holding that it
constituted “a significant change in circumstances” warranting a “renewed and thorough
evaluation of the risk of flight of each of the co-Accused.”94 Rule 98bis motions, similar to
summary judgment motions in U.S. law, require a court to examine “whether a reasonable trier
of fact could find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”95 The Appeals Chamber
viewed the advanced stage in proceedings as prejudicial to victims and witnesses. “[T]he
perception that persons accused of international crimes are released, for a prolonged period of
time, after a decision…dismissing a Rule 98bis motion, could have a prejudicial effect on
victims and witnesses.”96
¶56
After Petković, provisional release at the ICTY became exceptionally difficult for
defendants to obtain whenever the prosecution had finished presenting its case (unless they were
acquitted at the 98bis stage). Petković required that the accused demonstrate “compelling
humanitarian grounds” as a prerequisite to their provisional release after their case had passed
the 98bis stage. And the requirement also applied to defendants who did not move for acquittal at
the 98bis stage. It was imputed that failure to move for acquittal indicated acceptance that
evidence was presented during the prosecution’s case that was capable of supporting a
conviction.97 Such inaction similarly weighed against accused in the determination of eligibility
for provisional release.
¶57
The underlying implication was that the culpability of the accused increased as the trial
progressed which, in turn, provided the accused greater incentive to abscond while on
provisional release and increased the risk of flight.98 As such, after the 98bis stage—essentially
the midpoint of the trial—defendants were subject to significantly higher scrutiny. The
correlation Petković imputed between the advanced stage of trial and the increased culpability
was in contravention to the presumption of innocence.99 The presumption of innocence did not
fit well within the Petković’s “compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement. As a result, the
judicial divide regarding the relative value of the rights of the accused versus those of victims
¶55

Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević & Sreten Lukić, IT-07-85-T, Decision on Šainović Motion for
Temporary Provisional Release, ¶¶ 7–9 (Apr. 4, 2008); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan
Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Décision Relative à la Demande de Mise en
Liberté Provisoire de l’Accusé Čorić, With a Confidential Annex, 6–7 (Apr. 8, 2008); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan
Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević & Sreten Lukić, IT-07-85T, Decision on Lazarević Motion for Temporary Provisional Release Apr. 15, 2008) (italics added).
94 Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 15.
95 Id. ¶ 17.
96 Id.
97 See Davidson, supra note 6, at 46; see also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Perišić, IT-04-81-T, Decision on Mr. Perišić’s
Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 20 (Mar. 31, 2010). Perišić provides an illustrative example: the Defense
attempted to avoid the “sufficiently compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement by arguing that it only applied to
those accused who had moved for acquittal and a Chamber subsequently made a 98bis Ruling, which Perišić had
not. Even though the Trial Chamber was satisfied that the Accused was not a flight risk nor danger to any victims or
witnesses, in satisfaction of the objective criteria in Rule 65(B) the Trial Chamber noted that “Rule 98bis is used
when the Defence is of the view that there is no evidence capable of supporting a conviction. The corollary is that
when the Defence does not use this provision, it is of the view that it does have a case to answer.” Id. The Trial
Chamber denied Peršić provisional release.
98 See Davidson, supra note 6, at 52 (“although the judges claimed otherwise, it is difficult to escape the conclusion
that the heightened standard reflects a sentiment about the increased likelihood of conviction”); see also id. at 15
(“the ICTY’s heightened release standard after the prosecution has rested raises the possible inference that courts
view the presumption of innocence as weakening as more evidence comes in against an accused, even if they seek to
characterize the relevance of the evidence as the increased flight risk of the defendant”).
99 Id. at 51–52.
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and witnesses became more pronounced than ever. Petković set the stage for further debate about
the presumption of innocence’s proper place in the Tribunal’s provisional release jurisprudence.
¶58
From the outset, the Decision was seen as controversial and met with criticism.100 Critics
contended that Petković failed to properly employ precedent, that it lacked credibility, and that it
weakened the presumption of innocence of the accused at later stages of trial by attributing too
much significance to a 98bis Ruling. Some critics believed the new provisional release standard
to be unduly ambiguous.101 Perhaps most apparent was that the new requirement effectively
reversed the Tribunal’s attempts to reach conformity with internationally recognized rights of the
accused.
B. The Failure of Stare Decisis
1. Misinterpretation of Prlić Decision
¶59

The Petković Decision selectively relied on the Tribunal’s jurisprudence interpreting the
standard for provisional release, and misinterpreted that which it did rely on as implying the
“compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement. Most significantly, Petković misinterpreted the
Prlić Decision of March 11, 2008.102 In Prlić, the Appeals Chamber strictly scrutinized the
accused’s humanitarian justification and held that the humanitarian reasons advanced were not
“sufficiently compelling.”103 However, the Prlić Chamber did not intend to create binding
precedent for subsequent ICTY chambers. It repeatedly stressed the specific circumstances of its
case as the basis for denying provisional release.104 In fact, a member of the Appeals Bench in
Prlić, Judge Liu Daqun, stated in a later dissenting opinion that the ruling “was made in light of
the arguments presented” and was specific to the accused’s circumstances, and was most
definitely “not creating a general principle.”105 The reasoning exercised in Prlić did not purport
to become the new provisional release standard, nor did it describe how such a standard could be
See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić & Franko Simatović, IT-03-69-AR65.7, Decision on Franko
Simatovic’s Appeal Against the Decision Denying His Urgent Request for Provisional Release, ¶ 3 (May 23, 2011)
(Güney, J., dissenting) (describing the deduction made by the majority opinion as an “overstatement and
misleading” because the “well established” implication on which it relied did not reflect its tenuous support among
permanent Appeals Chambers Judges, was in fact “controversial,” and that such a stringent standard prior to
conviction runs afoul to internationally recognized human rights).
101 See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vujadin Popović, Ljubiša Beara, Drago Nikolić, Ljubomir Borovčanin, Radivoje
Miletić, Milan Gvero & Vinko Pandurević, IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, Decision on Consolidated Appeal Against
Decision on Borovčanin’s Motion for a Custodial Visit and Decisions on Gvero and Miletić’s Motions for
Provisional Release During the Break in the Proceedings, ¶ 3 (May 15, 2008) (Liu, J., dissenting in part) (“As for
what exactly ‘compelling humanitarian reasons’ are, although they have not been defined by the Majority, they seem
to amount to the same as the previous ‘exceptional circumstances’ in practice”).
102 Prlić, IT-04-74-AR65.5, supra note 82, ¶ 21 (“in the cases of Stojić and Prlić the Trial Chamber considered
Prlić’s request to visit his ailing father and brother and Stojić’s request to visit his ailing spouse, brother and parents,
to be requests based on humanitarian grounds without offering any indication of how much weight it ascribed
thereto…the Appeals Chamber finds that the various justifications…are not sufficiently compelling, particularly in
light of the 98bis Ruling, to warrant the exercise of the Trial Chamber’s discretion in favour of
granting…provisional release”).
103 Id.
104 See Popović, IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, supra note 98, ¶ 6 (Liu, J., dissenting in part) (“the ruling in the 11
March 2008 Decision was specific to the circumstances of that particular case and was made in light of the
arguments presented. It was not creating a general principle. By assessing whether the Trial Chamber erred in
finding that humanitarian reasons existed to justify provisional release, it did not mean that in each and every case
‘compelling humanitarian reasons’ were to become a prerequisite to granting provisional release”).
105 Id.
100
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satisfied. The Opinion merely referenced the specific humanitarian grounds presented and found
them insufficient to support release.
¶60
For this reason, several judges at the Tribunal voiced serious misgivings about Petković’s
reliance on the Prlić Decision as the basis for the “compelling humanitarian grounds”
requirement. Judge Guy Delvoie alluded to a reasoning gap between Petković and Prlić.106 The
assertion in Petković that the Tribunal’s jurisprudence implied provisional release could only be
granted if sufficiently compelling humanitarian grounds existed was misleading, he found,
because it relied on an erroneous deduction—requiring the meeting of a criterion for the grant of
provisional release is different than denying release because such grounds, among other reasons,
are deemed insufficient.107 Petković’s interpretation that an accused must provide compelling
humanitarian grounds is likewise quite different than Prlić’s denial of provisional release
because, among other reasons, such grounds are insufficient.108
¶61
The outcome of Petković was the creation of precedent that inhibited future chambers from
granting defendants provisional release absent “compelling humanitarian grounds.” However,
the Petković Chamber justified its holding as preventing the creation of precedent allowing for
provisional release without compelling humanitarian grounds. Ironically, the Chamber viewed its
decision as averting the creation of binding precedent:
The Appeals Chamber finds that there is no reason to establish a precedent
pursuant to which accused are granted provisional release [after the 98bis stage],
absent sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons.109
¶62

Evidently, it did precisely what it sought to prevent.
2. Petković’s Failure to Consider Milutinović

The Petković Appeals Chamber selectively relied on segments of the Tribunal’s
provisional release jurisprudence while ignoring other jurisprudence that, if considered, would
have led to a different outcome.110 This was most clearly evidenced in Petković’s failure to the
consider arguments advanced in Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al. (hereinafter “Milutinović”).111
¶64
On April 15, 2008, the Trial Chamber issued its decision in Milutinović, which interpreted
Prlić before Petković had been decided. The Milutinović decision addressed the humanitarian
reasons proffered by Vladimir Lazarević, a defendant whose 98bis motion for acquittal had been
¶63

ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić & Stojan Župljanin, IT-08-91-T, Decision Denying Mićo Stanišić’s Request
for Provisional Release During the Break After the Close of the Prosecution Case With Separate Declaration of
Judge Guy Delvoie, ¶¶ 5–6 (Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter “Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Nov. 18, 2011)] (Delvoie, J.,
concurring).
107 Id. ¶ 6 (Judge Delvoie wrote, “[I]t is my humble opinion that the Appeals Chamber placed improper reliance on
the sole previous decision, drawing a ratio from a reasoning applied in the circumstances of the specific case”)
(Delvoie, J., concurring).
108 Id.
109 Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 17 (internal citations omitted).
110 Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Nov. 18, 2011),,supra note 104, ¶ 6 (noting Petković “erroneously cited three earlier
decisions made by Trial Chambers in the circumstances of the facts before them to discern a pattern in the
development of that jurisprudence”).
111 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Milan Milutinović, Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir
Lazarević & Sreten Lukić, IT-05-87-T, Decision on Lazarevic Motion for Temporary Provisional Release (Apr. 15,
2008); see also Petković, supra note 10, ¶ 17.
106
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dismissed.112 Despite the advanced stage of the proceedings, the Milutinović Chamber tempered
the import of Lazarević’s proffered humanitarian reasons and granted him provisional release. In
its analysis of Prlić, the Trial Chamber found that because Prlić offered no “indication of how
much weight it ascribed” the accused’s humanitarian reasons, it did not interpret Prlić to be a
“per se legal ruling that provisional release must always be denied after a Rule 98bis ruling.”113
¶65
As later revealed by Judge Liu, Milutinović’s narrow interpretation of Prlić was
accurate.114 Thus, if the Petković Appeals Chamber had considered Milutinović, which clarified
the ambiguity contained in Prlić, then perhaps it would not have found the “compelling
humanitarian grounds” requirement to be implied by the Tribunal’s jurisprudence, and the
precedent would not have been established. Petković’s failure to consider Milutinović, combined
with its exclusive reliance on three other trial chamber decisions from which it derived the
“compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement,115 caused it to find the new requirement “wellestablished.” If it had considered Milutinović, perhaps Petković finding would have not have
been forceful enough to justify creating a new standard of provisional release. The fact that
Petković misinterpreted Prlić and disregarded Milutinović—the sole decision to have interpreted
Prlić correctly—suggests that its interpretation may have been colored by a provisional release
policy agenda.
3. Aleksovski and departure from precedent at the ICTY
¶66

Adherence to precedent protects the accused’s right to a fair trial by ensuring consistency
and predictability of judicial outcomes.116 The adherence to precedent at the ICTY is tempered
by a principle formulated in Prosecutor v. Aleksovski (hereinafter “Aleksovski”) ensuring that
“justice is done in all cases.”117 When faced with conflicting decisions, an appeals chamber is
obligated “to determine which decision it will follow.”118 Aleksovski instructs that an appeals
chamber should normally follow precedent, but that it may also depart from precedent “for
cogent reasons in the interests of justice.”119 To credit the reasoning in Petković is to accept that
it did not understand itself to be creating precedent. If it did, the Petković Chamber would have
submitted cogent reasons for departing from precedent, which it did not. As noted above, The
Petković Chamber sought to restrain the creation of precedent.
¶67
Nonetheless, Petković created binding precedent, and the precedent it created revealed
exactly the point on which it stood on the continuum between rights of the accused and those of
victims and witnesses. It clearly prioritized latter above the former. To be sure, Petković
prioritized preventing the improbable “prejudicial effect” that the accused’s provisional release
would have on victims or witnesses over the accused’s right to liberty and right to be presumed
Milutinović, IT-05-87-T, supra note 109, ¶¶ 17-21.
Id. ¶ 14.
114 See Popović, IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, supra note 98, ¶ 6 (Liu, J., dissenting in part) (“The ruling in the 11
March 2008 Decision was specific to the circumstances of that particular case and was made in light of the
arguments presented. It was not creating a general principle. By assessing whether the Trial Chamber erred in
finding that humanitarian reasons existed to justify provisional release, it did not mean that in each and every case
‘compelling humanitarian reasons’ were to become a prerequisite to granting provisional release”).
115 Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 17 (internal citations omitted); Stanišić, IT-08-91-T, supra note
104, ¶¶ 14–26.
116 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 105 (Mar. 24, 2000).
117 Id. ¶¶ 101–05.
118 Id. ¶ 111.
119 Id. ¶¶ 107–08; see also Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Feb. 25, 2011), supra note 104, ¶ 2 (Delvoie, J., concurring)
(stating Aleksovski Appeal Chamber judgment is the Tribunal’s leading jurisprudence on precedent).
112
113
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innocent. Even if the Petković Chamber did not actively seek to codify its value preference into
the Tribunal’s provisional release regime through precedent, it precluded the alternative value—
rights of the accused—from becoming a decisive factor in the provisional release inquiry.
4. Pušić, the Abandoned Alternative to Petković
¶68

Just two days after Petković was issued, on April 23, 2008, an Appeals Chamber
comprised of different judges took an alternative approach in Prosecutor v. Prlić et al. (“Pušić”).
The Pušić Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s grant of provisional release to Berislav
Pušić and emphasized the special role of the trial chamber in evaluating the criteria relevant to
the provisional release determination.120 According to Judge Liu, the Pušić Chamber accurately
interpreted the holding in Prlić.121 The Pušić Decision made the following commentary on the
relevance of compelling humanitarian reasons to the provisional release inquiry:
Because Rule 65(B) of the Rules does not require ‘sufficiently compelling’
humanitarian reasons for provisional release, this Bench understands the Prlić
Decision of 11 March 2008 to have ruled that it is only when a Trial Chamber,
having considered all the circumstances of the case and the impact of the
significant change of circumstances constituted by the 98bis decision, cannot
exclude the existence of flight risk or danger, that ‘sufficiently compelling’
humanitarian reasons, coupled with necessary and sufficient measures to alleviate
any risk of danger, can constitute a basis for resolving uncertainty and doubt in
favour of provisional release.122

Pušić espoused a markedly different interpretation of Prlić than was taken in Petković. It
did not find the requirement of “compelling humanitarian grounds” to be mandated by Prlić. The
Pušić Appeals Chamber tempered the weight afforded such grounds and rejected the imposition
of humanitarian reasons as a requirement for provisional release. Instead, it held that
humanitarian grounds had to be evaluated in the “‘context’ of the two requirements expressly
listed in Rule 65(B),”123 unlike Petković which viewed the “compelling humanitarian grounds”
requirement as separate from the objective factors contained in the Rule. Additionally, Pušić
held that the 98bis Ruling did not constitute a “pre-judgment” that increased the accused’s flight
risk.124
¶70
Compared to Petković, the Appeals Chamber in Pušić was more cognizant of the rights
infringed by detention, advancing a far less rigid interpretation of Prlić, and a far more
permissive standard for provisional release of defendants. The Pušić Chamber emphasized the
primacy of the objective criteria in the text of Rule 65(B), the discretion of the trial chamber to
grant provisional release, and found that humanitarian reasons were not required for provisional
release at any stage of proceedings. Pušić found that a defendant’s compelling humanitarian
¶69

See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić &
Berislav Pušić, IT-04-74-AR65.6, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution’s Urgent Appeal Against “Décision Relative
à la Demande de Mise en Liberté Provisoire de l’Accusé Pušić” Issued on 14 April 2008, (Apr. 23, 2008)
[hereinafter Pušić, IT-04-74-AR65.6].
121 Popović, IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, supra note 98 (Liu, J., dissenting in part).
122 Pušić, IT-04-74-AR65.6, supra note 119, ¶ 15.
123 Id. ¶ 14; Milutinović, IT-05-87-T, supra note 109, ¶¶ 14, 16 (internal citations omitted).
124 Pušić, IT-04-74-AR65.6, supra note 119, ¶ 15.
120
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reasons could only support a chamber’s granting of provisional release, not bar release of an
accused in their absence.125 It held that humanitarian reasons could become a “salient and
relevant factor in assessing whether to exercise discretion to grant provisional release,” but only
in favor of release.126
¶71
Contrary to the determinative role ascribed such humanitarian reasons in Petković, the
Pušić Appeals Chamber held that the trial chamber could exercise discretion to grant provisional
release regardless if the accused had humanitarian reasons. Noting the requirement’s absence
from Rule’s text, Pušić distinguished the requirements for an accused to be provisionally
released from that of a convicted defendant during his appeal.127 In sum, Pušić interpreted Prlić
dramatically differently than Petković by focusing the provisional release inquiry on the
objective factors.
¶72
As Pušić offered future chambers at the Tribunal another option to Petković, it cannot be
said that Petković was solely responsible for the three and a half year reign of the “compelling
humanitarian grounds” requirement. Per the Aleksovski principle, other appeals chambers could
also have departed from the Petković precedent in light of Pušić which was issued two days after
Petković. Subsequent chambers had reason to depart from the Petković requirement because it
significantly infringed on the presumption of innocence for the accused at the ICTY. When
presented with the option of which precedent to follow, Petković or Pušić, surely future
chambers could have chosen Pušić “for cogent reasons in the interests of justice.”128 Instead,
Pušić was the sole decision that did not to follow Petković’s lead and it became the singular
exception to the “compelling humanitarian grounds” precedent.
C. Rule amendment and lack of credibility
¶73

In addition to criticism that the new requirement was dubiously supported by the
Tribunal’s jurisprudence, criticism was also directed at the fact that the Petković precedent
effectuated an improper rule amendment to the RPE.129 The fact that the “compelling
humanitarian grounds” requirement could not have garnered enough support to effectuate a
proper amendment to the RPE, in turn, weakened its credibility as a whole.
¶74
The “compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement was tantamount to a Rule
Amendment because it created an additional requirement for provisional release on top of those
explicitly listed in the text of Rule 65(B). As such, several judges thought it should have gone
through the customary rule amendment system pursuant to Rule 6 of the RPE.130 However, it is
unlikely that the amendment would have succeeded in this way because Rule 6 requires greater
consensus than Petković received.131 Rule 6 mandates that in order for a rule amendment to be
adopted by the Tribunal, at least ten of the fifteen permanent judges must approve it in plenary
session.132 As seven of the fifteen permanent judges at the Tribunal voiced opposition to the
125

Id.
Id. ¶ 14.
127 Id. (“Unlike for convicted persons seeking provisional release under Rule 65(I) there is no requirement of
additional ‘special circumstances’ justifying release under Rule 65(B) because the burden borne by a duly convicted
person…. is necessarily distinct from the burden borne by an individual who is still presumed innocent.”).
128 Aleksovski, IT-95-14/1-A, supra note 115, ¶¶ 107–108.
129 Prlić, IT-04-74-AR65.5, supra note 82, ¶ 20.
130 ICTY RPE, Rule 6, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 46 (Oct. 21, 2011).
131 ICTY RPE, Rule 6(A), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 46 (Oct. 21, 2011).
132 ICTY RPE, Rule 6, U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 46 (Oct. 21, 2011) (“Proposals for amendment of the Rules may be
made by a Judge, the Prosecutor or the Registrar and shall be adopted if agreed to by not less than ten permanent
126
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requirement, it is impossible that the requisite ten judges would have voted to approve the
amendment in plenary session.133 As a result, the Petković amendment to Rule 65(B) through
precedent lacked credibility because it lacked the required judicial support.
¶75
It appeared the Petković Appeals Chamber did not consider; the prior amendment’s
purpose in liberalizing Rule 65(B), the support its holding carried with other ICTY judges, or the
weight due to be given to the rule at the time of the case in light of the international standards the
ICTY had been approaching, when it overturned the Rule that was specifically amended to
eliminate that which it reinstated.
¶76
Whereas the “exceptional circumstances” requirement of Rule 65(B) was deliberately
removed by amendment in accordance with Rule 6 (i.e., by confirmation of at least ten of the
judges at the ICTY),134the Petković Chamber itself was divided as to the interpretation of Prlić
and the resulting “compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement.135 If the compelling
humanitarian grounds requirement was indeed “well established in the Tribunal’s jurisprudence,”
as Petković advanced, critics asked: why was it not proposed or voted on in plenary session as
provided for in Rule 6 of the RPE? The de facto form of amendment—through precedent—
misrepresented the judicial support for the “compelling humanitarian grounds” provisional
release requirement imposed on defendants in advanced stages of proceedings. It is therefore
sensible that the requirement was widely criticized by other judges. More opposition was a likely
byproduct of the anomalous way in which the Rule was amended.
D. Too much weight attached to 98bis ruling and the conflation of standards
¶77

The Appeals Chamber’s added requirement of “compelling humanitarian reasons” was
criticized for attaching too much weight to the passage of the 98bis stage of the case.136 The
added weight effectively conflated the pre-conviction standard for provisional release with the
provisional release standard for those who the Tribunal had already convicted. Defendants
convicted at the ICTY’s trial level must prove that “special circumstances” exist warranting
provisional release in order to be released pending appeal.137 Petković held that the passage of
the 98bis stage required defendants who were presumably still presumed innocent to demonstrate
Judges at a plenary meeting of the Tribunal convened with notice of the proposal addressed to all Judges.”).
133 See Stanišić, IT-08-91-AR65.2, supra note 27, ¶ 10 (Güney, J., dissenting) (noting other judges who opposed the
requirement) (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić & Franko Simatović, IT-03-69-AR65.8, Decision on
Defence Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on Stanišić Defence Request for Provisional Release During
Summer Recess (Confidential) (Aug. 4, 2011); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak,
Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Decision on Slobodan Praljak’s Motion for
Provisional Release (Apr. 21, 2011) [hereinafter Prlić, IT-04-74 (Apr. 21, 2011)]; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić
& Stojan Župljanin, IT-08-91-T, Decision Denying Mićo Stanišić’s Request for Provisional Release During the
Upcoming Summer Court Recess (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (June 29, 2011)]; ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Momčilo Krajišnik & Biljana Plavšić, IT-00-39 & 40-PT, Decision on Momčilo Krajišnik’s Notice of
Motion for Provisional Release (Oct. 8, 2001) (Robinson, J., dissenting); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Ante Gotovina, Ivan
Čermak & Mladen Markač, IT-06-90-AR65.3, Decision on Ivan Čermak’s Appeal Against Decision on His Motion
for Provisional Release (Confidential) (Aug. 3, 2009) (Güney, J., & Liu, J., dissenting in part)).
134 Prlić, IT-04-74-AR65.5, supra note 82, ¶ 1 (noting the “sufficiently compelling humanitarian reasons”
requirement was instituted “by a slim majority of Appeals Chamber Judges (four out of seven),” amending the RPE
“that were specifically amended in 1999 to remove it”).
135 Id. (Güney, J., dissenting) (“Because the majority decision imposes an additional requirement of ‘sufficiently
compelling humanitarian reasons’ to the two criteria listed in Rule 65(B) of the Rules, contrary to both the Rules and
the continuing presumption of innocence, and effectively suspends the grant of discretion to the Trial Chamber by
the Rules, I respectfully dissent.”).
136 Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 17.
137 See ICTY RPE, Rules 65(B), (I), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 41 (Feb. 28, 2008).
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that sufficiently “compelling humanitarian grounds” existed warranting release. The requirement
mandated under Petković made it so that both scenarios required equivalent burdens of proof for
the defendant.
However, at the ICTY, the standard of proof required of the prosecution to force the
defense to present its case after a Rule 98bis motion for acquittal is far lower than what is
required for conviction.138 To overcome a Rule 98bis motion for acquittal the prosecution needs
only to present evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could convict, not must convict, a
purposely de minimis standard.139 In contrast, the standard of proof required for conviction is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. By mandating a premature appraisal of guilt by a more
stringent standard, Petković effectively mandated that post-98bis stage accused be treated as
guilty until proven innocent. This presumption of guilt is clear from the fact that an accused’s
failure to move for acquittal under Petković also required him to demonstrate “sufficiently
compelling humanitarian grounds” for release. This standard made treatment as guilty the clear
default for accused in late stages of proceedings.
International criminal statutes, human rights instruments, and ECtHR cases posit that the
presumption of innocence retains the same force for an accused at later stages of trial.140 To be
presumed innocent until proven guilty requires that the standard of proof used to justify
continued detention (or to be granted provisional release since detention is the default at the
ICTY) remain consistent until the accused is proven guilty. In common law countries the
standard of proof used to determine guilt is typically “beyond a reasonable doubt” and in civil
law countries it is commonly the judge’s innermost conviction.141 By analogy, the same
standards should apply to provisional release decisions if they were to assess an accused’s
culpability. The presumption of innocence requires that at no point prior to conviction should the
standard of proof deviate to a more stringent form. The Petković requirement suggested that the
passage of the 98bis stage indicated a heightened degree of guilt. As such, it violated the
presumption of innocence by prematurely assessing guilt, and it disenfranchised defendants’ due
process rights by subjecting them to a harsher standard of review with respect to provisional
release.
Predictably some judges took issue with Petković’s appraisal of a 98bis ruling. Judge
Robinson stated, “the position in law is that the dismissal of a motion for acquittal under Rule
98bis of the Rules does not place the accused any nearer to a conviction than to an acquittal.”142
Indeed, an accused may still be acquitted after a 98bis dismissal of a motion for acquittal, even
in the hypothetical scenario that the defense rests its case without calling further evidence,
because the standard of proof for acquittal at the 98bis stage is so much higher than the standard
for acquittal of conviction.143
Several judges, including Judge Robinson, felt that the high standard for provisional
release decisions could not be reconciled with the Tribunal’s mandate to uphold the presumption
of innocence, or with the purpose of Rule 98bis itself.144 The inference that the culpability of the
See Stanišić, IT-08-91-AR65.2, supra note 27, ¶ 13 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
Id.
140 Davidson, supra note 6, at 19 (citing ICCPR, supra note 18, pt. III, article 14(2) (“Everyone charged with a
criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law.”)).
141 Id. at 15 (citing CASSESE, supra note 21, at 390 and ZAPPALA, supra note 21, at 84).
142 Stanišić, IT-08-91-AR65.2, supra note 27, ¶ 12 (“The accused enjoys the benefit of the presumption of
innocence throughout the entire proceedings, no less so at the later than at the earlier stage of the trial.”).
143 Id.
144 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 13–14 (internal citations omitted) (Judge Robinson also noted that Rule 98bis originated in the
138
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accused is somehow greater after the close of the prosecution’s case-in-chief goes against the
former Secretary General’s instruction for the ICTY to respect the presumption of innocence at
“all stages of its proceedings.”145 This premature assessment of culpability after the prosecution’s
case runs afoul of the presumption of innocence, which ideally should only abate upon
conviction.
¶82
A careful and plain reading of the whole text of Rule 65 makes a singular binary
distinction among its subjects: accused and convicted. Accused must satisfy the objective criteria
set forth in Rule 65(B) of not posing a flight risk, nor danger to victims, witnesses or any other
person, but convicted war criminals must additionally satisfy Rule 65(I)’s requirement of
demonstrating that “special circumstances exist warranting such release.”146 According to Judge
Liu, had the Rule intended to distinguish among the accused at different stages of proceedings it
would have done so explicitly, as it did between the accused and convicted.147 The clear
difference between accused and convicted defendants is that an accused preserves the
presumption of innocence whereas a convicted person pending appeal does not.148 Critics
asserted that while it was reasonable to require such a precondition for convicted defendants, it
was inappropriate to have a similarly strict standard for the accused still presumed innocent.149
¶83
Concerns regarding conflation of the requirements for the accused and convicted pervaded
ICTY jurisprudence following Petković and featured routinely in dissents.150 The Trial Chamber
in Prosecutor v. Stanisić & Zupljanin was among the most vocal in raising the conflation
problem. The Trial Chamber took issue with the conflation of legal standards between the guilty
and innocent and noted that the “compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement contradicted
presumption of innocence.151 Solely because of the Petković requirement, the Trial Chamber
denied Mićo Stanišić’s application for provisional release when it would not have otherwise.
¶84
This provisional release regime contravened the presumption of innocence doctrine in all
three possible ways. The conflation of standards among the convicted and accused violated the
first feature of the presumption, requiring treatment as innocent until proven guilty. As the
accused in later stages of proceedings were treated as less innocent than accused at earlier stages,
they were plainly denied treatment as innocent. Second, while not specific to the “compelling
humanitarian grounds” provisional release regime, the burden of proof for the provisional release
inquiry remained with the defense . Finally, the standard of proof for provisional release became
common law, designed to prevent layperson juries from “bring[ing] in an unjust conviction.” He noted that there is
no jury at the ICTY, rather, there is a bench of three professional trial judges capable of evaluating evidence to
determine what items could sustain a conviction. Unlike its original purpose to protect the rights of the accused, the
added weight attached to the 98bis stage of proceedings became a mechanism by which their rights were
undermined) (internal citations omitted).
145 U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to ¶ 2 of Security Council Resolution 808, ¶
106, U.N. Doc. S/25704, ¶ 106 (May 3, 1993).
146 See ICTY RPE, Rule 65(I) & Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc IT/32/Rev. 41 (Feb. 28, 2008).
147 See, e.g., Popović, IT-05-88-AR65.4 to 65.6, supra note 98, ¶ 4 (Liu, J., dissenting in part) (arguing that had the
“Rules intended to raise the threshold for provisional release at the post-98bis stage, like the post-conviction stage, it
would have similarly been explicitly provided for in the Rules”).
148 Stanišić, IT-08-91-AR65.2, supra note 27, ¶ 17.
149 Id.
150 Id. ¶ 13 (Robinson, J., dissenting) (likewise noting the improper conflation of the two requirements and urging
their separation).
151 Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Feb. 25, 2011), supra note 104, ¶ 26 (“The Trial Chamber questions whether it would have
been the intention of the Appeals Chamber in its post-2008 development of the jurisprudence to create as high a
standard for accused after the end of the Prosecution case as that set forth by Rule 65(I) for convicted persons. In the
Trial Chamber’s view, this would not only go against the apparent words of Rule 65(B) but would also contradict its
underlying principle – the presumption of innocence of the accused.”).
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inconsistent after Petković. It fluctuated depending on the stage of proceedings. And after the
98bis stage, the main component of the standard of proof became subjective, which is
incompatible with the clarity and consistency mandated by international human rights law. 152
E. Effects of the Compelling Humanitarian Grounds Requirement
¶85

The new rule had the predictable effect of eliciting several applications for provisional
release in succession, where the accused focused on augmenting the humanitarian circumstances
warranting release—a red queen game of sorts.153 Provisional release applications were
eventually reduced to a “fight over the defendant’s health and propinquity of relatives.”154
Naturally, the accused, after previously being denied provisional release, exaggerated
circumstances in subsequent applications to convince the chamber that their humanitarian
circumstances were actually sufficiently compelling to warrant provisional release.
¶86
For example, shortly after Petković, in Prosecutor v. Popović et al. (hereinafter
“Popović”), Milan Gvero argued for release strictly based on the objective factors in Rule
65(B)—that he was neither a danger nor a flight risk.155 After the Appeals Chamber overturned
the order granting him provisional release because he did not offer any humanitarian
circumstances in support, by the next court break, he suddenly had humanitarian grounds—“his
well-being” had “deteriorated during the course of proceedings.” 156 This was the perverse
consequence of Petković on the ICTY’s provisional release regime. The nebulous requirement
abstracted the inquiry from the objective prongs, and wasted both the chambers’ and the
accused’s time.
¶87
Moreover, the “compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement effectively took the
provisional release inquiry out of the trial chamber’s hands. Deference is afforded to the trial
chamber’s discretion in these decisions because they “draw on the Trial Chamber’s organic
familiarity with the day-to-day conduct of the parties and practical demands of the case, and
require a complex balancing of intangibles in crafting a case-specific order to properly regulate a
highly variable set of trial proceedings.”157
¶88
The back and forth between chambers and accused results from the fact-intensive inquiry
required by applications for provisional release. This is why the Chamber in Milutinović
emphasized the importance of the trial chamber’s discretion. By eliminating the trial chambers’
ability to exercise discretion to grant provisional release when satisfied that the accused posed no
danger or flight risk, the appeals chamber bore the burden of adjudicating more cases than it
would otherwise, which was a waste of judicial resources.

See Popović, IT-05-88-AR65.4–65.6, supra note 98, ¶ 3 (Liu, J., dissenting in part) (“As for what exactly
‘compelling humanitarian reasons’ are, although they have not been defined by the Majority, they seem to amount to
the same as the previous ‘exceptional circumstances’ in practice.”).
153 If we treat getting provisional release granted as the accused’s overriding goal, then its objectives remain
constant even if provisional release policy at the ICTY changes. The Red Queen hypothesis deals with the process
by which accused’s actions change to keep up with the shifting requirements.
154 Davidson, supra note 6, at 49–51; see also Popović, IT-05-88-AR65.4–65.6, supra note 98, ¶¶ 9, 26, 28 (holding
that the defendant’s father’s illness or death did not justify provisional release).
155 Id.
156 Id.
157 Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 8 (Güney, J., dissenting) (quoting ICTY, Prosecutor v. Slobadon
Milošević, IT-02-54-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal of the Trial Chamber’s Decision on the Assignment
of Defense Counsel, ¶ 9 (Nov. 1, 2004)).
152
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In this way, the Petković condition of “compelling humanitarian grounds” for accused in
late stages of proceedings took the Tribunal’s provisional release jurisprudence back to square
one. The amendment upset the Tribunal’s alignment with international human rights norms
regarding the presumption of innocence. The next section will elucidate how the ICTY remedied
this mistake by amending Rule 65(B) on October 28, 2011.
PART FOUR: THE OCTOBER 28, 2011 AMENDMENT
A. The Amended Rule 65(B)

¶90

On October 20, 2011, by decision of the plenary session of the ICTY, Rule 65(B) was
amended to take force on October 28, 2011.158 Rule 65(B) now states:
Release may be ordered at any stage of the trial proceedings prior to the
rendering of the final judgment by a Trial Chamber only after giving the host
country and the State to which the accused seeks to be released the opportunity to
be heard and only if it is satisfied that the accused will appear for trial and, if
released will not pose a danger to any victim, witness or other person. The
existence of sufficiently compelling humanitarian grounds may be considered in
granting such release.159

¶91

The objective and procedural prongs of Rule 65(B) have remained the same, but the new
provisions in the Rule address the former subjective “compelling humanitarian grounds”
requirement directly. The two most prominent changes to the Rule are: (i) its explicit
clarification that provisional release applies to the accused “at any stage of the trial proceedings
prior to the rendering of the final judgment”—i.e., the accused is still presumed innocent even at
late stages of trial; and (ii) the explicit discretionary weight given to the former mandatory
“compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement as criteria for determining provisional
release.160 The amendment directly addresses the most egregious faults of Petković to the benefit
of the accused.
¶92
The first change, “[r]elease may be ordered at any stage of the trial proceedings prior to the
rendering of the final judgment,” clarifies the former uncertainty in the jurisprudence regarding
whether an accused retains the same right to provisional release after the 98bis stage of
proceedings.161 The text of the Rule for the first time emphasizes the stages at which provisional
release applies—all stages prior to conviction. Rule 65(B) now unequivocally applies equally to
all accused, at all times.162
¶93
The second significant change directly overturns the former requirement that an accused,
post-98bis, demonstrate “compelling humanitarian grounds” to be granted provisional release.
Now, such grounds “may be considered,” but are not determinative.163 They also, however, may
be considered to a greater or lesser degree, or they may not be considered at all. The existence of
158

ICTY RPE, Rule 65(B), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 46 (Oct. 20, 2011).
Id. (emphasis added).
160 Id.
161 Id. (emphasis added).
162 Id.
163 Id.
159

134

Vol. 11:3]

Raphael Sznajder

“compelling humanitarian grounds” are now wholly within the trial chambers’ purview to assign
importance, or not, in deciding applications for provisional release.
¶94
Rule 65(B) now expressly confers trial chambers at the Tribunal with the discretion they
were previously denied. Given the opposing views of judges at the Tribunal with respect to
provisional release described above, such discretion may carry the risk of inconsistent decisionmaking depending on the composition of the adjudicating chamber. If one chamber opted to
heavily weigh such considerations and another did not, inconsistent provisional release outcomes
could result for similarly situated accused. This would be viewed as unfair because, as stated by
Judge Shahabuddeen, provisional release determinations “should not be predicated on the chance
composition of a bench.”164 If the early decisions to interpret the Rule are any indication, the risk
of inconsistency appears unlikely.
1. Early Results: Stanišić
Prosecutor v. Stanišić & Zupljanin (“Stanišić”) was the first provisional release decision
issued following the October 28, 2011 amendment to Rule 65(B). The Stanišić defense filed a
Motion for provisional release on the first day that the amendment to Rule 65(B) took effect. 165
The Prosecution responded on November 11, requesting a stay in the event that the Chamber
granted his Motion.166 The Defense replied on November 14, and the Trial Chamber issued its
Decision granting Stanišić provisional release and denying the Prosecution’s request for a stay
on November 18, 2011.167
¶96
Interestingly, the Prosecution in Stanišić acknowledged that the elimination of the
subjective requirement for provisional release converted such grounds “from a limitation…to an
ex gratia justification for granting provisional release,”168 while still arguing that Stanišić’s
personal circumstances “such as health and family problems” were not “comparable to those that
have featured in other Trial Chambers’ decisions to release accused during court recesses.” 169
¶97
The Prosecution advanced several of the arguments used to justify the Tribunal’s
historically stringent provisional release practice: the gravity of the crimes,170 the effect on
victims provisional release could have,171 the public’s perception of the Tribunal, the ICTY’s
limited resources, and its lack of an enforcement mechanism.172 Invoking the former justification
for heightened scrutiny post-98bis, the Prosecution pointed out that Stanišić had accepted that
¶95

See e.g, Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Feb. 25, 2011), supra note 104, ¶ 2 (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, IT-0368-A, Judgment, ¶ 15 (July 3, 2008) (Shahabuddeen, J., concurring)).
165 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić & Stojan Zupljanin, IT-08-91-T, Decision Granting Mićo Stanišić’s Request
for Provisional Release (Nov. 18, 2011) (including confidential annexes).
166 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić & Stojan Zupljanin, IT-08-91-T, Prosecution’s Response to Stanišić’s Motion
for Provisional Release During the Upcoming Winter Court Recess, ¶ 13 (Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter Stanišić, IT08-91-T (Nov. 11, 2011)].
167 Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Nov. 18, 2011), supra note 165, ¶¶ 1, 25.
168 Id. ¶ 6.
169 Id. ¶ 10.
170 Id. ¶ 12 (“There is a real possibility that he will not be held accountable for these crimes given the near
completion of his trial and the Tribunal’s mandate.”).
171 Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Nov. 18, 2011), supra note 165, ¶ 12 (“The costs of delaying or discontinuing this trial at
this stage in the proceedings due the absence of the Accused would therefore be immense not only in terms of
Tribunal resources, but also in the impact…on the victims, the witnesses who have testified in this case and the
public’s perception of this Tribunal.”).
172 Id. (“The Tribunal has expended considerable time and resources on the prosecution of this case, and it lacks law
enforcement capabilities to search for and apprehend its fugitives.”).
164
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there was evidence capable of supporting his conviction by not making a Rule 98bis submission
and that the Defense witnesses had “bolstered” the evidence against him, thereby increasing his
incentive to abscond.173 It argued that no conditions imposed on Stanišić could adequately
guarantee his reappearance for trial and requested a stay in the event that his Motion were
granted so it could appeal pursuant to Rule 65(E).174
¶98
The Stanišić Trial Chamber, of which former dissenter Judge Delvoie formed part, noted
that Stanišić would have been granted provisional release in his previous two applications but for
the requirement of compelling humanitarian grounds.175 The Chamber could now grant Stanišić
provisional release because the amendment “converted the requirement of showing compelling
humanitarian grounds…to a discretionary consideration.”176 As the Accused did “not raise
[humanitarian reasons] as a ground for provisional release, the Trial Chamber need not address
this issue any further.”177
¶99
The Chamber assessed the objective prongs of Rule 65(B) de novo and again found that
Stanišić did not pose a risk of flight or a danger to victims, witnesses, or other people.178 It noted
several factors favoring the grant of provisional release179 and rejected the Prosecution’s
argument that his failure to make a 98bis motion for acquittal constituted an acceptance that
evidence existed supporting his conviction.180 With respect to the Prosecution’s argument that
the Defense witnesses had “bolstered” the evidence against him, the Chamber noted that it would
be premature to assess this argument as there existed a “continuing presumption of innocence
afforded to the Accused at all stages of trial prior to the rendering of the final judgment.”181
¶100
Mićo Stanišić was granted provisional release for the 2011 winter recess. Perhaps most
revealing about the Decision was that the Chamber denied the Prosecution’s request for a stay.
Denials of Rule 65(E) stays are very rare as trial chambers are typically very deferential to
appeals chambers at the ICTY. The denial indicates the Chamber’s overwhelming support of the
amendment and may also be seen as a direct rebuke of Petković. However, on a practical level,
granting the stay would defeat the purpose of release in the first place because it would have
likely meant that Stanišić remained at the UNDU until the Appeals Chamber adjudicated the

173

Id. ¶ 11.
Id. ¶¶ 11, 13; see also ICTY RPE, Rule 65(E), U.N. Doc. IT/32/Rev. 46 (Oct. 20, 2011) (“The Prosecutor may
apply for a stay of a decision by the Trial Chamber to release an accused on the basis that the Prosecutor intends to
appeal the decision, and shall make such an application at the time of filing his or her response to the initial
application for provisional release by the accused.”).
175 See, e.g., ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić & Stojan Zupljanin, IT-08-91-T, Decision Denying Mićo Stanišić’s
Request for Provisional Release During the upcoming Summer Court Recess, ¶ 38 (June 29, 2011) [hereinafter
Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (June 29, 2011)] (“It is only due to the overriding effect of Appeals Chamber’s precedent, of
which the Trial Chamber is cognisant, that the Motion must be denied for lack of ‘compelling humanitarian
grounds.’”); Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Feb. 25, 2011), supra note 104, ¶ 30 (“…[I]t is only the change in the stage of the
proceedings which, due to the overriding effect of Appeals Chamber precedent…requires that the Motion be denied
for lack of ‘compelling humanitarian grounds.’”).
176 Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Nov. 18, 2011), supra note 165, ¶ 14.
177 Id. ¶ 14.
178 Id. ¶ 15.
179 Id. ¶¶ 17–22 (noting factors favoring provisional release, including Stanišić’s strong track record of compliance
with the conditions of his release in the past, his voluntary surrender to the Tribunal, and that he was seeking release
to Serbia where he would be able to work with his Defense team, not to Bosnia Herzegovina, where most of the
victims of the alleged crimes resided).
180 Id. ¶¶ 19, 23 (“The decision not to make such submissions may well be based on other grounds. This argument is
therefore dismissed.”).
181 Id. ¶ 23; see also ICTY Statute, supra note 19, article 21(3).
174
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Prosecution’s appeal, which may have lasted longer than the release period itself.182 The
Chamber weighed “the interests and the risk at stake” in favor of the Accused.183 Stanišić has had
every extension of provisional release sought granted by the Trial Chamber since the amendment
was instituted.184
2. Early Results: Prlić II
¶101

The second provisional release decision released post-amendment was in Prosecutor v.
Prlić et al. (“Prlić II”).185 Jadranko Prlić, an Accused awaiting final judgment after the
conclusion of his trial, filed a motion for provisional release on October 31, 2011, seeking
release until judgment was rendered.186 The Prosecution objected to his release for an “indefinite
period of time.”187 The Prlić II Trial Chamber issued its Decision on November 24, 2011,
granting provisional release for a renewable period of three months, but issued a stay pending a
ruling on the Prosecution’s Appeal.188 The Appeal was dismissed.189
¶102
The Prlić II Trial Chamber acknowledged the 2011 Amendment and conducted its
provisional release inquiry exclusively by reference to the procedural and objective criteria
contained in the text of the Rule. Even noting that Prlić had breached “certain conditions” of
provisional release in the past, the Chamber decided he could still be provisionally released.190
Citing the international human rights principle that provides, “if it is sufficient to use a more
lenient measure than mandatory detention, it must be applied,” the Chamber noted Prlić’s
detention of over five years, and proceeded to grant him provisional release at the very latest
stage of proceedings.191
¶103
On December 15, 2011, the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had not
abused its discretion in granting Prlić provisional release and dismissed the Prosecution’s
appeal.192 Regarding the Prosecution’s argument that the Trial Chamber had abused its discretion
Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Nov. 18, 2011), supra note 165, ¶ 25 (“[W]ith regard to the Prosecution’s request for the
stay of this Decision, the Trial Chamber notes that the temporary provisional release of the Accused is scheduled to
commence 20 working days from the date of this Decision and has been specifically timed to take place during the
upcoming recess in the trial and religious holidays. After a thorough assessment of the interests and the risk at stake,
the Trial Chamber finds it inappropriate to grant a stay, considering, moreover that there will be sufficient time for
the Prosecution to lodge an application for expedited appeal of the Decision pursuant to Rules 65(D) and 116bis.
Accordingly, the Trial Chamber denies the Prosecution’s request for a stay.”).
183 Id.
184 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Mićo Stanišić & Stojan Župljanin, IT-08-91-T, Decision Granting Mico Stanišić’s
Second Motion for an Extension of Provisional Release (Nov. 19, 2012) [hereinafter Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Nov. 19,
2012)]; see also ICTY, Prosecutor v. Stanišić, IT-08-91-T, Decision Granting Mico Stanišić’s Request for
Provisional Release (June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (June 6, 2012)]; Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Feb. 25,
2011), supra note 104.
185 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav
Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Decision on Jadranko Prlić’s Motion for Provisional Release, ¶ 1 (Nov. 24, 2011) [hereinafter
Prlić II, IT-04-74-T (Nov. 24, 2011)].
186 Id. ¶ 1.
187 Id. ¶ 3.
188 Id. ¶¶ 42, 47.
189 Id. ¶ 18.
190 Id. ¶¶ 28–29.
191 Prlić II, IT-04-74-T (Nov. 24, 2011), supra note 185,¶ 36 (citing Limaj, supra note 12, ¶ 12) (“Rules 65(B) &
65(D) of the Rules must therefore be read in the light of the ICCPR and ECHR and the relevant jurisprudence.”).
192 ICTY, Prlić II, IT-04-74-AR65.26, Decision on Prosecution’s Appeal of Decision on Provisional Release of
Jadranko Prlić, ¶ 7 (Dec. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Prlić II, IT-04-74-AR65.26 (Dec. 15, 2011)]; ICTY, Prosecutor v.
Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav Pušić, IT 04-74182
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by not giving due weight to Prlić’s lack of “compelling humanitarian circumstances justifying
release,” the Appeals Chamber clarified, “there is …no absolute requirement for a Trial Chamber
to take into account the existence of such [humanitarian] grounds before ordering a release.” 193
¶104
On March 1, 2012, the Trial Chamber extended Prlić’s provisional release for an additional
three months.194 The Prosecution had argued that Prlić’s protracted release would have a
negative effect on the Tribunal’s aim of contributing to the stability of the Former Yugoslavia.
The Chamber countered that it achieved its aim by trying those accused of having committed
such grave crimes “by delivering justice to the victims of these crimes through just and fair
trials.”195 It reminded the Prosecution that, “an accused is presumed innocent from the beginning
of the trial until the day of the judgment.”196 The Appeal was dismissed.197 Prlić was granted
subsequent extensions of provisional release while awaiting final judgment.198
¶105
Prlić’s co-accused, Valentin Ćorić, Slobodan Praljak, Bruno Stojić, and Milivoj Petković199
were all similarly granted provisional release and subsequent extensions while awaiting final
judgment.200 Moreover, the Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v. Stanišić and Simatović granted
Franko Simatović provisional release even before hearing from the host country.201 Simatović’s
next request for provisional release, and an extension were also granted.202
AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 6 (“The Appeals Chamber will only overturn a Trial Chamber’s decision on provisional
release where it is found to be (1) based on an incorrect interpretation of the governing law; (2) based on a patently
incorrect conclusion or fact; or (3) so unfair or unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of the Trial Chamber’s
discretion.”) (internal citations omitted).
193 Id. ¶ 7.
194 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav
Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Redacted and Public Version of Order on Jadranko Prlić’s Motion to Extend His Provisional
Release, 7 (Mar. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Prlić, IT-04-74-T (Mar. 1, 2012)].
195 Id. at 4.
196 Id. at 4–5.
197 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav
Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal of the Decision on Further Extension of Jadranko Prlić’s
Provisional Release, ¶ 24 (Apr. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Prlić, IT-04-74-T (Apr. 23, 2012)].
198 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav
Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Public Redacted Version of Order on Motion to Extend Provisional Release of Jadranko Prlić, 6
(June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Prlić, IT-04-74-T (June 6, 2012)].
199 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić &
Berislav Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Decision on Motion for Provisional Release of the Accused Milivoj Petković, ¶¶ 46–47
(Nov. 30, 2011) [hereinafter “Petković II”].
200 See ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić &
Berislav Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Public Redacted Version of Order on Motion to Extend Provisional Release of Accused
Ćorić, 6–7 (Mar. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Prlić, IT-04-74-T (Mar. 6, 2012)]; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno
Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Public Redacted Version
of Decision on Motion for Extension of Provisional Release of Accused Slobodan Praljak and Modification of
Conditions, 8–9 (Mar. 8, 2012) [hereinafter Prlić, IT-04-74-T (Mar. 8, 2012), Public]; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko
Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Redacted and
Public Version of Order on Bruno Stojić’s Motion for Extension of His Provisional Release, 6 (Mar. 8, 2012)
[hereinafter Prlić, IT-04-74-T (Mar. 8, 2012), Redacted]; ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić,
Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković, Valentin Ćorić & Berislav Pušić, IT-04-74-T, Redacted Version of Decision on
Motion for Extension of Provisional Release of Accused Milivoj Petković and Modification of Conditions, 7–8
(Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Prlić, IT-04-74-T (Mar. 14, 2012)].
201 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić & Franko Simatović, Decision on Simatović Request for Provisional
Release, IT-03-69-T, ¶ 8 (Dec. 13, 2011) [hereinafter Stanišić, IT-03-69 (Dec. 13, 2011)].
202 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić & Franko Simatović, IT-03-69-T, Decision on Simatović Request for
Provisional Release (Apr. 4, 2012) [hereinafter Stanišić, IT-03-69 (Apr. 4, 2012)]; see also Prosecutor v. Jovica
Stanišić & Franko Simatović, IT-03-69-T, Decision on Simatović Request for Extension of Provisional Release
(Sept. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Stanišić, IT-03-69 (Sept. 24, 2012)].
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¶106

On March 23, 2012, an ICTY trial chamber did have occasion to reject an application for
provisional release.203 The Accused, Vojislav Šešelj, had not secured a host country to stay at
during his planned release; he had not even determined himself where he wanted be released
prior to applying.204 Šešelj had been found guilty of contempt of court for divulging confidential
witness information and obstructing justice, and had several charges pending against him. 205 The
Chamber was not satisfied that he met any of the objective and procedural requirements of Rule
65(B).206 The Trial Chamber cited the controversial excerpt in Petković with a qualification,
stating that it considered only the “potential impact of his provisional release on the victims and
witnesses to be a factor militating against a decision granting the Request.”207
¶107
On January 30, 2012, Jovica Stanišić was denied provisional release due to his precarious
health condition, but later granted provisional release by a Decision four months later.208 His coaccused, Franko Simatović, was again granted provisional release on April 4, 2012.209 Sreten
Lukić, a defendant who had already been convicted and was awaiting judgment on appeal, was
denied provisional release pursuant to Rule 65(I), for lack of “special circumstances” post
amendment.210 Another convicted defendant, Jelena Rašić, was granted provisional release postamendment because the Appeals Chamber found that special circumstances did exist—namely,
she had already served the custodial portion of her sentence.211
B. Early Conclusions Drawn from the Amendment
¶108

In its early application, the new Rule 65(B) appears promising from a human rights
perspective. In provisional release decisions at the ICTY since Rule 65(B) was amended,
provisional release has been granted consistently for accused in late stages of proceedings. All of
the accused that had provisional release granted had been previously denied provisional release
under the “compelling humanitarian grounds” provisional release regime.212 The change in the
ICTY, Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, IT-03-67-T, Decision on the Accused Vojislav Šešelj’s Request for
Provisional Release, ¶¶ 10, 18 (Mar. 23, 2012).
204 Id. ¶ 6.
205 Id. ¶¶ 11–13.
206 Id. ¶ 13.
207 Id. ¶¶ 10–11 (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jadranko Prlić, Bruno Stojić, Slobodan Praljak, Milivoj Petković,
Valentin Ćorić & Berislav Pušić, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, Decision on “Prosecution’s Appeal from Décision relative à la
Demande de Mise en Liberté Provisoire de l’Accusé Petković dated 31 March 2008,” ¶ 15 (Apr. 21, 2008)) (“[T]he
perception that persons accused of international crimes are released, for a prolonged period of time, after a decision
that a reasonable trier of fact could make a finding beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty could
have a prejudicial effect on victims and witnesses”).
208 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić & Franko Simatović, IT-03-69-T, Public Redacted Version of the
Confidential “Decision on the Stanišić Defence Request for Provisional Release During the Winter Recess” of 19
December 2011, ¶¶ 14, 16 (Jan. 30, 2012); ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić & Franko Simatović, IT-03-69-T,
Public Redacted Version of the Confidential “Decision on the Stanišić Defence Request for Provisional Release” of
10 April 2012, ¶ 15 (May 8, 2012).
209 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanišić & Franko Simatović, IT-03-69-T, Decision on Simatović Request for
Provisional Release, ¶ 8 (Apr. 4, 2012).
210 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Nikola Šainović, Dragoljub Ojdanić, Nebojša Pavković, Vladimir Lazarević & Sreten
Lukić, IT-05-87-A, Decision on Sreten Lukić’s Motion for Provisional Release, 2 (Mar. 30, 2012).
211 ICTY, Prosecutor v. Jelena Rašić, IT-98-32/1-R77.2-A, Decision on Jelena Rašić’s Urgent Motion for
Provisional Release Pursuant to Rule 65(I), ¶¶ 12–13 (Apr. 4, 2012).
212 See also ICTY, In the Contempt Case of Milan Tupajić, IT-95-5/18-R77.2, Decision on Motion for Provisional
Release, ¶ 4B (Dec. 21, 2011) (Tupajić was not post-98bis, but nonetheless was granted provisional release); ICTY,
Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, IT-03-67-T, Decision on the Accused Vojislav Šešelj’s Request for Provisional
Release, 3 (Mar. 23, 2012) (Šešelj was not granted provisional release because he failed to meet the objective and
procedural components of Rule 65(B)).
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Rule effected a significant change in practice. As such, the Amendment addressed the major
problems articulated in judges’ dissenting opinions during the Petković provisional release era,
and seems to have resolved them.
In Stanišić, the accused had been denied provisional release both times he applied
following the 98bis stage of his case, even though he had been provisionally released several
times before reaching this stage.213 Prlić and his co-accused were all similarly granted
provisional release in the past and only denied provisional release due to “compelling
humanitarian grounds” requirement. The Trial Chambers granted them provisional release as a
direct result of the 2011 amendment and the Appeals Chamber upheld the Decisions. In all of the
provisional release decisions since the amendment, the accused were in late stages of trial—all
post 98bis stage—and, some were in the latest possible stage of trial proceedings, while awaiting
final judgment.
In a textual nod to the numerous dissents over the preceding three years that argued an
inappropriate conflation of the standard for an accused, still presumed innocent, with that of a
convicted person, the amended Rule explicitly creates a singular exception to its application; it
does not apply to convicted persons. In specifying the distinction between accused and convicted
persons, the October 2011 amendment to Rule 65(B) once again links the ICTY’s provisional
release regime to the presumption of innocence wherefrom it had briefly separated. This
distinction is evident in practice, as the denials of provisional release only affected defendants
that had previously been found guilty. Rule 65(B) now makes explicit that it applies uniformly to
all accused until their status changes by way of acquittal or conviction.
The October 2011 amendment also appears to reflect the gaining traction of international
standards regarding rights of the accused. Several of the post-amendment decisions reference the
presumption of innocence and, most decisions have confined the provisional release analysis
strictly to the objective and procedural criteria. As such, the inquiry has shifted towards objective
analysis and a more serious consideration of the rights of accused in balance against others. 214 In
his article calling for a more robust presumption of innocence in ICTR provisional release
practice, Daniel Rearick noted, “[b]ecause the accused is presumed innocent, ‘[i]f it is sufficient
to use a more lenient measure, that measure must be applied.’”215 The fact that several of the
provisional release decisions post-amendment have quoted the exact same passage is indicative
of a deliberate attempt to give meaning to the presumption of innocence at the ICTY.216
However, it is still clear that all of the judges do not agree on the appropriate standard. The
amended Rule still allows for consideration of humanitarian grounds and post-amendment
decisions are not uniformly objective. The Chamber in Šešelj, for example, referenced the
controversial passage from Petković regarding the increased burden of accused in later stages of
proceedings and cited other familiar justifications for provisional release stringency.
The contingent of ICTY judges that endorse the “exceptional circumstances” and
“compelling humanitarian grounds” requirements for provisional release have not necessarily
converted, and their reasons for a higher standard of release cannot be dismissed. The defendants
at the ICTY are not garden-variety criminals; they are accused of heinous crimes on a mass
Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Nov. 18, 2011), supra note 165.
See, e.g., Stanišić, IT-08-91-T (Nov. 18, 2011), supra note 165, ¶¶ 11–12; see also Prlić II, IT-04-74-T, supra
note 185, ¶¶ 9–10; Petković II, IT-04-74-T, supra note 199, ¶¶ 11–12.
215 Rearick, supra note 25, at 591 (citing ICTY, Prosecutor v. Radoslav Brdanin & Momir Talić, IT-99-36-T,
Decision on Motion by Momir Talić for Provisional Release, ¶ 23 (Mar. 28, 2001)).
216 Petković II, IT-04-74-T, supra note 199, ¶ 36; Prlić II, IT-04-74-T, supra note 185, ¶ 36.
213
214
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scale. The ICTY lacks an enforcement mechanism for recapturing accused in the case of flight.
Moreover, the potential effect on witnesses and victims is very serious as the conflict is in the
former Yugoslavia is relatively fresh and many of the accused once wielded enormous influence
there.
¶114
However, if the principal issues in the provisional release analysis are ensuring that
accused appear for trial and pose no danger to victims and witnesses in their regions of origin,
then the objective and procedural analysis should be sufficient to determine the suitability of
their provisional release.217 Alternatively, if the objective in detention for those still “presumed
innocent” is punitive and not practical, then the presumption of innocence should not even be
entertained because punishment is not for the innocent. The fact that the objective factors of Rule
65(B) are finally being given foremost attention indicates that the focus of the provisional release
inquiry has indeed become practical, and the presumption is now given legitimate force.
C. Potential Problems Down the Road
¶115

The October 28, 2011 amendment appears to have been a direct critique of the previous
provisional release regime at the ICTY. The amendment addressed the numerous dissents and
criticisms of the subjective requirement, and basically invoked the remedies to the critiques into
the amended Rule. Inasmuch as the amendment was a direct rebuke of the former “compelling
humanitarian grounds” requirement, ICTY judges on the other side of the issue—those that
prioritize victims’ interests and the Tribunal’s practical constraints—may not have fully
embraced the new model. This possibly indicates that the new Rule does not enjoy broad support
among judges. The discretionary power now afforded trial chambers—while favoring
provisional release in the provisional release decisions after one year—could easily work the
other way, to justify the denial of provisional release if a trial chamber were to choose to
consider humanitarian grounds.
¶116
As detrimental as the former requirement was to the rights of the accused in late
proceedings, it was, at least, consistent. Because trial chambers were previously constricted in
the exercise of positive discretion to grant provisional release to accused (those that did not
possess the ambiguously-defined “humanitarian grounds”) there was certain predictability to the
outcome of provisional release decisions—denial.218 Now trial chambers have the positive
discretion to grant provisional release, but they also retain the negative discretion to deny
provisional release.
¶117
There is division among judges at the ICTY as to the competing values at stake in
provisional release. This is evident from the divergence in proposals for Rule 65(B) amendment
submitted by Judge Meron versus those put forth by Judges Hall, Delvoie, and Harhoff, who
proposed much less stringent options.219 Thus, the potential for inconsistent provisional release
decision-making is a valid concern. Especially given how the former subjective requirement
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See Rearick, supra note 25, at 591.
See, e.g., Stanišić & Župljanin, IT-08-91-T, supra note 175, ¶ 24 (calling provisional release “a mandatory, and
not discretionary, factor”).
219 See Memorandum from Michael Karnavas to Judge Agius, ICTY, Proposed Amendment to Rule 65(B), 16 (Oct.
14, 2011) (discussing divergent judicial proposals for amendment, from Judge Meron— who proposed codifying the
Appeals Chamber’s position, requiring a showing of “compelling humanitarian grounds” at advanced stages of the
proceedings—on one hand, to the comparatively liberalized amendment proposed by Judges Hall, Delvoie, and
Harhoff on the other).
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came about—through controversial precedent lacking consensus support—the possibility of
another misinterpretation should not be discounted.
¶118
A plain reading of the former Rule 65(B) on provisional release reveals that it only
contained the objective and procedural criteria for an accused to meet in order to be granted
provisional release, yet the “compelling humanitarian grounds” requirement materialized
resulting in a provisional release practice that several judges did not support. As the problem did
not originate from the Rule’s text, it is unclear whether a textual solution will be a panacea for
provisional release at the Tribunal. It is for this reason that Michael Karnavas, the former
President of the Association of Defence Counsel (ADC) at the ICTY, submitted a twenty-eight
page memorandum recommending that Rule 65(B) not be changed.220
¶119
Despite his opposition to the “compelling humanitarian reasons” as ultra vires inconsistent
with the rights of the accused, Mr. Karnavas found that the solution to the problem could not lie
in inserting the invalid ground into the Rule, albeit for the goal of reducing its influence. Rather,
Mr. Karnavas recommended the ICTY judges depart from the faulty precedent in plenary
session.221 Moreover, the October 2011 amendment only addressed problems documented in
dissents, but it is unclear how it could prevent future misinterpretations. With the increased role
of judicial discretion, further misinterpretation is certainly possible.
¶120
The concern about the trial chamber’s discretion being exercised inconsistently, resulting
in unfairness, remains to be seen. However, the trial and appeals chambers at the ICTY do
appear to be working together, as seen in Prlić II where the Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial
Chamber’s decision.222 Furthermore, since the October 2011 amendment went through the proper
protocol of judicial vote in plenary session, it assuredly was supported by at least two-thirds of
the judges, unlike the previous amendment, which was added by precedent in a majority opinion.
This fact provides assurance that judicial discretion will not be applied inconsistently.
CONCLUSION
Justice cannot be for one side alone, but must be for both. - Eleanor Roosevelt
¶121

Provisional release jurisprudence at the ICTY has been a constant struggle between
balancing the ICTY’s unique practical and ideological realities with the rights of the accused, in
particular, the presumption of innocence. The various manifestations of Rule 65(B) have
reflected this struggle: the “exceptional circumstances” regime until November 1999, the regime
after its elimination until April 2008, the “compelling humanitarian grounds” regime until
October 2011, and finally, Rule 65(B) as it exists today.

220

Id. at 1 (“Codifying the additional criterion risks causing permanent damage to the Tribunal’s legacy; it amounts
to using the rule amendment procedure to legitimize a new criterion that is inconsistent with the spirit of the Statute,
that manifestly transgresses the fair trial rights of the accused (in particular the presumption of innocence), that
denies individuals their right to bail except in the most exceptional circumstances, and that sends the message that
provisional detention is a form of punishment. The Appeals Chamber should be urged by the Plenary to reconsider
and depart from its previous decisions given that cogent reasons have been shown which demonstrate the additional
criterion’s lack of legal basis and inconsistency with international human rights principles.”).
221 Id.
222 Prlić II, IT-04-74-AR65.26, supra note 192, ¶ 7; Petković, IT 04-74-AR.65.7, supra note 10, ¶ 6 (“The Appeals
Chamber will only overturn a Trial Chamber’s decision on provisional release where it is found to be (1) based on
an incorrect interpretation of the governing law; (2) based on a patently incorrect conclusion or fact; or (3) so unfair
or unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of the Trial Chamber’s discretion.”) (internal citations omitted).

142

Vol. 11:3]

Raphael Sznajder

¶122

The trajectory of the Rule and the Tribunal’s jurisprudence reflect a back-and-forth
between a stringency reflecting the gravity of the crimes committed and the Tribunal’s limited
powers to enforce its mandate, and a more liberal approach aspiring to provide accused—
irrespective of their crimes—with the sort of robust presumption of innocence common to many
domestic jurisdictions; victim’s rights and rights of the accused. Despite the significant misstep
in Petković, the overall path of Rule 65(B) has been towards a liberalization of the criterion for
provisional release, one that embraces the presumption of innocence.
¶123
The Tribunal’s early stringency in provisional release may be attributed to the context in
which it operated, both practically and ideologically. It has been said that, “the extreme character
of the crimes alleged before international criminal courts makes the case for accountability
stronger than in domestic prosecutions.”223 The ICTY was no exception. Professor Gordon
recognized this:
There is an ineluctable tension in certain phases of war crimes prosecutions
between upholding the due process rights of the accused and assuring the safety
and dignity of witnesses to unspeakable horrors. Not surprisingly, that tension
often resolves itself in favor of victims and witnesses.224
¶124

Previously at the Tribunal, this accountability justified the stringency in provisional release
determinations. Thus, especially in its early years, the retention of accused was critical to its
mission of holding perpetrators of such grave crimes accountable and the chance of them
absconding presented too serious a risk to employ a more liberal provisional release regime. Its
initial stringency may also be attributed to the fact that the ICTY was a pioneer in international
criminal law, learning by trial and error as it went, so it did not take chances that it might have,
had it benefited from the experience of prior tribunals operating in a similar context.
¶125
As the Tribunal now approaches the completion of its mandate, having arrested every
single accused it has indicted, the balance has tipped away from jeopardizing its completion
mandate towards solidifying its legacy in history and setting a lasting example for this generation
of international criminal tribunals. Right now that means the provision of more substantive rights
for the accused. Now that the risk of an uncompleted mandate is remote, the ICTY can afford to
relax its provisional release regime because the stakes are lower. It appears the ICTY has done
just that. However, the Tribunal had more than merely posterity in mind in the October 28, 2011
amendment of Rule 65(B); the amendment is more accurately attributable to its desire to change
provisional release practice by affording greater respect for the rights of the accused. As
Karnavas noted in his memorandum to Judge Agius, an amendment would not have been
necessary otherwise since Rule 65(B) did not actually reference the “compelling humanitarian
grounds” requirement. The requirement had been created by faulty precedent and not inscribed
into the RPE, but its elimination was inscribed. Thus, the amendment can be interpreted as a
pragmatically genuine desire to respect the rights of the accused. The effects of the amendment
are broad because the Tribunal is close to completing its mandate, meaning that the vast majority
of the accused are in late stages of trial.225
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Gordon, supra note 5, at 699 (citing Jacob Katz Cogan, International Criminal Courts and Fair Trials:
Difficulties and Prospects, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 111, 114 (2002)).
224 Gordon, supra note 5, at 693.
225 Key Figures, ICTY WEBSITE, http://www.icty.org/sections/TheCases/KeyFigures (last visited Apr. 14, 2013).
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It appears to have done that. According to public records, at the time of this writing, every
application for provisional release by a defendant not yet found guilty after the recent
amendment has eventually been granted, even though the accused are all at very late stages of
proceedings. Thus, for the first time in its history, both the text of Rule 65(B) and the ICTY’s
jurisprudence are consistent with the ICCPR, because detention is no longer the “general rule.”226
The October 2011 amendment provides the ICTY’s accused with a meaningful
presumption of innocence, which can be seen through the practical effect it has had already by
allowing the release of accused who would not otherwise have been freed. As the burden of
proof remains with the defense in applications for provisional release, the Tribunal’s
implementation of the presumption of innocence is still not quite on par with international
standards, but the amendment does give meaning to the presumption of innocence in a more
substantive way than ever before—a point most judges applying the revised Rule have
emphasized.
However, no matter how much has been learned over its nearly two-decade existence, no
matter how much the stakes have lowered, or how much it wants to shape its legacy, the
presumption of innocence will always be more an aspiration than an absolute rule at the ICTY.
The serious consideration given to the rights and interests of victims, the gravity of the crimes it
adjudicates, and its lack of an enforcement mechanism all converge to make the ICTY’s context
unsuitable for the grant of an absolute presumption of innocence to its accused. Professor
Gordon additionally notes that the common law-civil law union causes “certain due process
rights” to be “sacrificed.”227 Due to its unique situation, it is not useful to compare the Tribunal’s
provisional release regime to that of a domestic jurisdiction. Moreover, even domestic
jurisdictions, without many of the ICTY’s unique realities, often temper the presumption of
innocence with respect to provisional release.228
The October 2011 amendment was a step in the right direction. It demonstrates that the
Tribunal is still evolving towards affording greater respect for rights of the accused, towards
providing the presumption of innocence without jeopardizing its core mission of prosecuting the
untouchables. The judges at the ICTY appear to have achieved a compromise to the competing
views that have defined the provisional release debate with the end result airing on the side of the
rights of the accused. Even if an absolute presumption will never be possible, in providing a
consistent standard of proof, with minimal ambiguity, and granting provisional release as a
general rule, the ICTY has achieved a reasonable balance among its competing aims.
The ICTY has a responsibility to lead by example because its RPE and jurisprudence will
and do serve as a guide for present and future international criminal tribunals. Needless to say,
the rights afforded accused at the ICTY are far greater than those rights afforded to accused in
the Nuremburg Trials, the ICTY’s chief predecessor. At the Nuremburg Trials there were
minimal due process rights provided defendants and no allowance made for provisional release
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ICCPR, supra note 18, art. 9(3) (“It shall not be the general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in
custody.”).
227 Gordon, supra note 5, at 639.
228 For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has found the presumption inapplicable to “a determination of the rights of
a pre-trial detainee during confinement…” Thus, other jurisdictions have also found that the presumption does not
mean that the accused is actually innocent and privy to the full rights and treatment as a person who is actually
innocent. See WILLIAM SCHABAS, THE U.N. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA,
RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 518 (2006) (citing Bell v. Wofish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979); see also Davidson, supra
note 6, at 20–21 (citing United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 744 (1987)).
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of the accused.229 Further, Nuremburg did not have a statute mandating the provision of the
presumption of innocence to its defendants.230 By comparison, the ICTY has made substantial
advancements in affording accused due process rights and, in doing so, paved the way for others,
such as the ICC.
¶131
The ICC was described as “the culmination of five decades of progress toward the
realization of protection for human rights throughout the world.”231 It learned from the ICTY
and, perhaps as a result, now grants more robust rights to accused in international criminal
proceedings than many of its peers.232 Even so, Caroline Davidson noted that there has been
strong pressure on the ICC to detain its accused.233 As the ICC “will rely on the procedures,
holdings, and lessons of the ICTY,” and is impacted by the Tribunal’s RPE, the Tribunal’s recent
amendment may serve to alleviate some of the pressure felt recently at the ICC to detain
defendants.234 However, because of the ICC’s superior funding, divergent jurisdiction, and
preeminent position as an international criminal tribunal without a completion mandate, the
amendment to Rule 65(B) will not likely have much practical effect on its provisional release
practice. It will, however, present it with a paramount example of judicial compromise and
perseverance in the high stakes work of international criminal law.
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Gordon, supra note 5, at 643–44 (describing that the Nuremburg Charter and its RPE contained a “skeletal set of
due process guarantees for the Nuremberg defendants.” They were: “(1) pre-trial—explanation of the right to trial;
receipt of the indictment, Charter, and a list of defense counsel—and (2) at trial—the right to give an explanation of
the charges, to have a translation of the proceedings (if necessary) to conduct a defense or have assistance of
counsel, and to present evidence and cross-examine hostile witnesses”) (internal citations omitted).
230 Id. at 645 (“There was no express rule on the presumption of innocence.”) (internal citations omitted).
231 Id. at 658 (citing Jeremy Rabkin, The Politics of the Geneva Conventions: Disturbing Background to the ICC
Debate, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 169, 171 (2003)).
232 ZAPPALA, supra note 21, at 25, 48.
233 Davidson, supra note 6, at 70.
234 Gordon, supra note 5, at 658–59; see Rabkin, supra note 231 (citing Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of
Age, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 463 (1998) (“The rules of procedure and evidence each Tribunal has adopted now form
the vital core of an international code of criminal procedure and evidence that will doubtless have an important
impact on the rules of the future international criminal court.”)); see also Rabkin, supra note 231 (citing Scott
Luftglass, Crossroads in Cambodia: The United Nations’ Responsibility to Withdraw from the Establishment of a
Cambodian Tribunal to Prosecute the Khmer Rouge, 90 VA. L. REV. 893, 953 (2004) (“The ICC will have
jurisdiction over genocide, crimes against humanity and serious war crimes, meaning that it will rely on the
procedures, holdings, and lessons of the ICTY [and] the ICTR.”)).
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